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ABSTRACT
Title of Dissertation:

Better Balanced Representation in the IMO Forum

IMO, the specialized agency of UN responsible for the global maritime safety and
marine environmental protection, announced an initial strategy in 2018, aiming to
reduce shipping’s GHG emission by at least 50% by 2050, compared to the 2008’s
levels. The society demands even more as required by the Paris Agreement. IMO,
however, decided to postpone the adoption of the revised strategy until 2023 due to
lack of internal consensus.
In this context, TI assessed IMO’s governance and reported that IMO requires reform
as its policy-making is too much influenced by private interests. Given the above, this
dissertation attempts to make a comprehensive analysis of IMO’s existing
decision-making processes and participants therein.
The roles of private interest groups in the IMO decision-making are examined, taking
into account the fact that, since IMO is a forum to create the regulatory framework for
shipping, consultation with the industry is considered inevitable in its policy-making.
Relevant information is explored, including IMO documents and instruments,
industry’s reports, research papers and other necessary maritime literature, with a view
to ascertaining whether conflicts of interests exist across the IMO forums.
Recognizing both the merits and demerits of industry’s involvement in IMO
rule-making, careful investigation is made into the existing mechanism within IMO
for the trade-off between the safety and benefit goals, together with relevant good
examples of ILO, another specialized agency of UN. Special attention is called to
IMO’s FSA and ILO’s tripartite system which are suggestive of well-balanced
mechanisms between public and private interests.

III

The concluding chapter, summarizing the results of the above investigation, attempts
to offer some recommendations which are considered as appropriate methodologies of
ensuring better balanced representation in IMO forums.
Degree:

Master of Science

KEYWORDS :

IMO policy-/rule-/decision-making, conflicts of interest, public
interest, private interest, balanced representation, trade-off

IV

CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................... II
ABSTRACT............................................................................................................... III
CONTENTS.................................................................................................................V
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................... VI
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................. VII
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................... IX
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1
1.1
Background ............................................................................................... 1
1.2
TI’s assessment on the governance of IMO .............................................. 6
CHAPTER 2 SAFE AND EFFICIENT SHIPPING － IMO’S
IMPORTANT TELEOLOGY .........................................................11
2.1
Inseparable relation between shipping and economic growth ................ 12
2.2
Regulatory framework in shipping ......................................................... 16
CHAPTER 3 ANALYSIS TO PRIVATE INTERESTS’ ROLE IN
IMO ................................................................................................... 19
3.1
Advantages in private interests’ contribution ......................................... 19
3.2
Disadvantages in private interests’ involvement .................................... 25
3.2.1 Private interest in the GHG reduction............................................. 25
3.2.2 Undesirable impact of private interests on IMO’s work
as a whole....................................................................................... 27
CHAPTER 4 SEEKING FOR THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN
SAFETY AND BENEFIT ............................................................... 47
4.1
Anticipated disadvantages in case of absence of maritime
players in IMO forums............................................................................ 47
4.2
Consideration on IMO’s current mechanism to ensure
effective policy making processes .......................................................... 50
CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 63
5.1
Findings .................................................................................................. 63
5.2
Recommendations................................................................................... 64
Bibliography .............................................................................................................. 69
Reference ................................................................................................................... 72
Appendix 1 Make-up of delegations from some selected IMO member
States at MEPC 72 and MSC 99 ............................................................ 77
Appendix 2 Non-governmental Organizations in Consultative Status
by Interests/Activities .......................................................................... 101

***

V

LIST OF TABLES
Table 1.

SDGs provided in UNGA resolution A/RES/70/1

Table 2.

Shipping CO2/CO2e emissions compared with global
CO2/CO2e

Table 3.

Some member States’ contribution to IMO budget

Table 4.

The number of NGOs in consultative status by
interests/activities

Table 5.

World economic growth, 2016-2017

Table 6.

International seaborne trade growth (millions of tons
loaded), 2016-2017

Table 7.

World seaborne trade, 2016-2017 (Type of cargo, country
group and region)

Table 8.

Efficiency improvement estimated by Japan

Table 9.

History of the amendment to the ISM Code

Table 10.

Representation of some member States in the IMO
forums

Table 11.

The number of NGO participants present at recent IMO
meetings, grouped by interest and activities

Table 12.

Casualty statistics and accident frequencies for general
cargo ships (1997-2008)

Table 13.

Summarized results of CBA on RCOs 2 and 20
***

VI

LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.

Annual growth of world fleet and seaborne trade,
2000-2017 (percentage)

Figure 2.

Regulatory framework in shipping

Figure 3.

CO2 emissions by ship type (international shipping only)
for all years 2007-2012

Figure 4.

Categories of IMO treaties

Figure 5.

CO2 emissions scenarios proposed by some States

Figure 6.

Average number of major oil spill per year (over 700
tonnes)

Figure 7.

Oil spillage from 1970 to 2015 including tanker accidents

Figure 8.

Declining trend in shipping losses from 2008 to 2017

Figure 9.

SHELL model

Figure 10.

Three types of preventive measures

Figure 11.

Reason’s model

Figure 12.

Diagram, recommended by IMO, illustrating how a
sequence of events leads to a casualty occurrence

Figure 13.

Factors contributing to organizational drift

Figure 14.

MLC amendment procedure

Figure 15.

IMO tech rule making process in MSC/MEPC and their
subsidiary bodies

VII

Figure 16.

Flow chart of the FSA methodology
***

VIII

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
ACAG

Ad hoc Capacity-building Needs Analysis Group

AIS

Automatic Identification System

A 30

30th session of the Assembly of the International
Maritime Organization

CIC

Code

of

the

International

Standards

and

Recommended Practices for a Safety Investigation
into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident
CO2e

CO2 equivalent

CSO

civil society organization

DSDG

Division for Sustainable Development Goals

ECDIS

Electronic Chart Display Information System

EEDI

Energy Efficiency Design Index

FSA

Formal Safety Assessment

GBS

goal based standard

GCAF

Gross Cost of Averting a Fatality

GHG

green house gas

HMSO

Her Majesty’s Stationary Office

IACS

International Association of Classification Societies

ICS

International Chamber of Shipping

III Code

IMO Instruments Implementation Code

IX

INDC

Intended Nationally Determined Contribution

ILO

International Labor Organization

IMO

International Maritime Organization

INTERCARGO International Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners
INTERTANKO International Association of Independent Tanker
Owners
ISM Code

International Management Code for the Safe Operation
of Ships and for Pollution Prevention

ITCP

Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme

ITF

International Transport Workers’ Federation

LDC

Least Developed State

MARPOL

International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (1973)

MDG

Millennium Development Goal

MEPC

Marine Environmental Protection Committee of IMO

MEPC 70

70th session of MEPC

MEPC 72

72nd session of MEPC

MSC

Maritime Safety Committee of IMO

MSC 46

46th session of MSC

MLC

Maritime Labor Convention (2006)

NCAF

Net Cost of Averting a Fatality

X

NGO

non-governmental organization

OECD

Organization

of

Economic

Cooperation

and

Development
PSC

port State control

RADAR

Radar Data Transmission System

RCO

risk control option

SDC 5

5th session of the Sub-Committee on Ship Design and
Construction

SDG

Sustainable Development Goal

SEEMP

Ship Energy Efficiency Management Plan

SIDS

Small Island Developing State

SOLAS

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(1974)

SMS

safety management system

TC

Technical Cooperation Committee of IMO

TC 65

65th session of TC

TC 66

66th session of TC

TI

Transparency International

TSCI

International Association of Technical Survey and
Classification Institutions

UN

United Nations

XI

UNCTAD

NU Conference on Trade and Development

UNDESA

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs

UNFCCC

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change

WSC

World Shipping Council

WTO

World Trade Organization
***

XII

CHAPTER 1.
1.1

INTRODUCTION

Background

IMO’s commitment to SDGs
In September 2015, all the United Nations (UN) member States, developed and
developing, unanimously adopted the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development by
the United Nation General Assembly (UNGA) resolution A/RES/70/1 at a Summit for
Sustainable Development, including the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
and 169 related targets. The SDGs aim at improving health and education, promoting
equality, protecting environment and spurring economic prosperity with poverty put
an end to. Therefore, the 2030 agenda is called a plan of action for “people, planet and
prosperity” (IMO, 2015)1. Today, the Division for Sustainable Development Goals
(DSDG) in the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) offers
substantial support for the SDGs, focused on water, energy, climate, oceans,
urbanization, transport, science and technology. DSDG plays a key role in the global
implementation of the 2030 Agenda. In order for all the SDGs to come true in time,
they should be incorporated into a strong commitment by all stakeholders to ensure
their effective global engagement. DSDG aims at promoting this engagement (UN,
2015)2. Among the above mentioned stakeholders the most considerable is shipping
entities.

1

Further information is given in the IMO website:
http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/41-SDGS.aspx

2

Further information is given in the UN website: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/about

1

Table 1. SDGs provided in UNGA resolution A/RES/70/1

2

Source: United Nations (25 October 2015). Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development (Resolution A/Res/70/1). Retrieved May 14, 2019 from the
World Wide Web.
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/post2015/transformingourworld

As a saying goes, oceans do not so much as divide as unite the world. It reminds the
world community of shipping’s significance. In fact, shipping is regarded as the
backbone of the global trade. All year round, ships transport goods to everywhere of
the world, encouraging consistent economic growth and spreading prosperity across
the countries. This way, shipping contributes to achieving all the SDGs from ending
poverty and hunger to strengthening the global partnership for sustainable
development.
Given the above, the International Maritime Organization (IMO), a specialized agency
of the UN responsible for the global maritime safety and security and marine
environmental protection, has recognized the importance of its engagement in SDGs
and continuously striven to establish, implement and update its maritime policies to
help achieve the SDGs at the national, regional and global level.
IMO’s efforts to help achieve UN’s goals already commenced in 2000 when the UN
adopted the Millennium Declaration by UNGA resolution A/RES/60/1 including eight
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to reduce extreme poverty by 2015. In
September 2000 IMO committed itself to contribution to achieving the MDGs by
adopting and implementing its Assembly resolution A.1006(25) on the Linkage
between the Integrated Technical Cooperation Programme (ITCP) and the MDGs
(IMO, TC 65/5). IMO, at the 65th session of its Technical Cooperation Committee (TC
65) held in 2015, reviewed its engagement in the achievement of the MDGs and
reported that its ITCP had successfully supported, in particular, five MDGs (IMO, TC
65/16, pp.13-14). In the following year, it identified the linkage between ITCP and
SDGs at TC 66 which highlighted that SDGs 5, 13, 14 and 17 were especially relevant
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to IMO’s work while many other SDGs were also noted to be IMO work related (IMO,
TC 66/5(c)). Finally IMO member States sat together at the 30th session of IMO
Assembly (A 30) in December 2017 and agreed to the cooperation for the SDGs
achievement, by adopting IMO Assembly resolutions A.1110(30) on Strategic Plan
for the Organization for the Six-year Period 2018 to 2023 and A.1126(30) on
Linkages between the Technical Assistance Work of IMO and the 2030 Agenda for
Sustainable Development.
The public pressure that IMO faces now
Despite all its above efforts, IMO’s SDG-related business does not seem to keep pace
with the times.
Shipping is related to any of the 17 SDGs as shown in Table 1 but IMO’s greatest
concern is focused on SDG 13 on climate change and SDG 14 on ocean conservation.

Table 2. Shipping CO2/CO2e emissions compared with global CO2/CO2e (values in
million tonnes CO2/CO2e)
Source: IMO (2014). MEPC 67/INF.3, p.12

4

Shipping is regarded as the most effective and efficient transportation as it contributes
to approximately 2.5% of the global CO2 emission as shown in table 2 (IMO, MEPC
67/INF.3, p.12) while it carries around 80% of global trade by volume and over 70% of
global trade by value (UNCTAD, 2017, p.x). However, if left unregulated, its
greenhouse gas (GHG) emission will increase to account for 17% of the whole by
2050 (TI, 2018, p.2).
In light of the above, IMO sought for an effective mechanism of ensuring a real
contribution to the global GHG emission decrease, given the fact that the Paris
Agreement (2015) entered into force on 4 November 2016. The Paris Agreement aims
at holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2℃ above
pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5℃
above pre-industrial levels. Since it does not take sectoral approaches, IMO member
States invited the Marine Environmental Protection Committee (MEPC), IMO’s
organ responsible for addressing any environmental protection related issues, to
define the shipping sector’s fair share in the global efforts to reduce GHG emission.
One year later, at the 70th session of the Marine Environmental Protection Committee
(MEPC 70) in 2016, the International Chamber of Shipping (ICS) et al. suggested
that a road map for IMO’s fair share should be determined while Angola et al.
proposed to develop a roadmap for enhancing the energy efficiency of international
shipping. MEPC 70, having considered these proposals in details and other related
comments thereabout, developed the draft roadmap for ship GHG emission reduction
strategy to be finalized by 2023 after the following three phases (IMO, MEPC 70/18,
pp.44-51; MEPC 70/19/Add.1, Annex 11):
Phase 1 data collection (January 2019);
Phase 2 data analysis (no later than autumn 2020); and
Phase 3 decision step (Spring 2022).

5

Based on the above preparation, in April 2018 IMO adopted the Initial IMO Strategy
on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships by resolution MEPC.304(72) which aims
to decrease shipping’s GHG emission by at least 50% by 2050, compared with the
2008’s levels. This strategy is likely needed to be immediately revised upwards in
order to decarbonise the maritime sector in line with below 2°C and/or 1.5°C
temperature goals of the Paris Agreement. However, the adoption of the revised
strategy is planned to come true five years later.
The significance of IMO’s role cannot be overestimated in achieving the SDG 13 and
the world community, therefore, hopes that IMO will make greater strides to a
zero-GHG initiative by 2050.
1.2

TI’s assessment on the governance of IMO

In this context, the Transparency International (TI) evaluated IMO’s governance
structure to consider whether it will help or hinder the policy making. To the surprise it
made public a report arguing that IMO needs reform (TI, 2018, p.4)3. TI indicates in its
report the following four key problems to be solved:
The uneven influence of member States;
The influence of open registries;
The disproportionate influence of industry; and
The lack of delegate accountability.
The uneven influence of member States
The report indicates that IMO’s rule-making processes are unfair. It takes as an
example the fact that IMO’s policy-making is dominated by a small number of States

3

Transparency International (2018). Governance at the International Maritime Organization. The case
for reform. Berlin: Author.
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which make big contributions to IMO’s budget and other decisions based on the size of
their fleets. Nine of the top ten contributing States are members of the Council which is
the executive body of IMO. Further, the Council publishes no substantive information
about its activities. Entry-into-force of IMO treaties are also much influenced by the
States with greater tonnages since none of them take effect until they have been
acceded to by those States that collectively regulate a specified percentage of the
world’s shipping fleet.
The influence of open registries
The report points at the existing open registry system as a serious problem. Open
registries and international registries allow States to offer substandard ships favorable
regulatory environments which biases the ship registry into profit earning rather than
enforcement purpose. This mechanism has a serious impact on IMO’s work. For
example, the biggest four open registries including Panama, Liberia, the Marshall
Islands and the Bahamas can exercise influence over IMO through the funding and
treaty ratification system.
Contribution amount Percentage in IMO
(Unit: £million)
budget
Panama
5.3
19.3
Liberia
2.5
8.8
Bahamas
1.4
4.9
Marshall Islands
1.3
4.8
UK
1.3
4.8
Greece
1.2
4.3
Singapore
1.1
4.1
Malta
0.97
3.5
Japan
0.94
3.4
China
0.91
3.3
Table 3. Some member States’ contribution to IMO budget
Member State

Source: Du Dachang (2018). Marine Environment Protection Standards.
Class handout, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, China
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The disproportionate influence of industry
According to the above report, private interest groups have easy access to IMO’s
rule-making process thorough the consultative status that IMO endowed them with. As
shown in Table 4, the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with the consultative
status in IMO forums totals 814. Analysis of five recently held IMO meetings shows
that industry representatives considerably outnumbered civil society organization
(CSO) representatives, as shown in Table 115 (TI, 2018, p.25).
Categories of NGOs with IMO’s consultative status
Number
Cargo and port (IAPH, ICHCA, CEFIC, IICL, IOGP, SIGTTO,
13
DGAC, WNTI, IBTA, IVODGA, IBIA, BIC, IIMA)
Environment (FOEI, ITOPF, IUCN, ACOPS, Greenpeace, WWF,
13
IPIECS, IOI, IFAW, ISCO, Pacific Environment, CSC, Pew)
Insurance (IUMI, P & I Clubs)
2
Legal (CMI, IIDM)
2
Navigation (IALA, CIRM, IMPA)
3
Professional and Representative bodies (IFSMA, IMarEST, IHMA,
7
RINA, ITF, NI, WISTA International)
Rescue (ISU, IMRF)
2
Security (IAASP)
1
Shipbuilding (CESA, SYBAss, ASEF)
3
Ship owners/ship operators (ICS, BIMCO, OCIMF, IADC,
12
INTERTANKO, INTERCARGO, CLIA, InterManager, IPTA, IMCA,
INTERFERRY, WSC)
Standards (ISO, IEC, IACS, ICOMIA, ILAMA, EUROMOT,
12
WORLD SAILING, ITTC, IPPIC, NACE INTERNATIONAL,
IWMA, SGMF)
Trade (ICC, IRU, ISSA, FONASBA, IPCSA)
5
Training/education/welfare (IAIN, IMLA, ICMA, IMHA, IAMU,
6
GlobalMET)
Total
81
Table 4. The number of NGOs in consultative status by interests/activities

4
5

Further information is given in the IMO website: https://docs.imo.org/Category.aspx?cid=746
More detailed consideration to this issue is given in section 4.2 of this dissertation.
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Source: Author compiled from IMO (2018)

Another eye-catcher is that private company delegates represent their governments at
IMO meetings as there are no rules governing the appointment of national delegations.
The lack of delegate accountability
TI’s report states that IMO member State delegates are shielded from public scrutiny.
Journalists are forbidden from naming speakers at meetings without gaining their
consent. As a result, the public do not know which delegates are arguing for which
issues.
TI’s recommendations
Out of the above analysis, TI recommends IMO to:
a.) engage in a process of open dialogue with its external stakeholders on how it
can improve transparency;
b.) take steps to ensure that its decision-making processes better reflect the
public interest; and
c.) ensure that all those who engage in decision-making are subject to robust
integrity rules and measures.
In particular, it makes the point that IMO should develop and implement rules
governing the appointment of national delegates of its member States and their
behavior as well as better balanced representation among different interest groups. It
further recommends that IMO should consider developing a Code of Conduct for
Council members, Member State delegates and consultative members in order to
regulate their conduct while operating under the auspices of IMO.
It is of great significance to ensure properly balanced representation in the IMO forum
not only in achieving SDGs on GHG reduction but also in promoting safety and

9

security. Biased representation surely leads to disaster of over-regulations or of
under-regulations either of which will hinder safe, secure, clean and efficient shipping.
Given the above, this dissertation attempts to analyse the IMO’s governance with a
focus on the influence of private interests on IMO policies, based on TI’s report.

10

CHAPTER 2.

SAFE AND EFFICIENT SHIPPING－IMO’S
IMPORTANT TELEOLOGY

The most notable in the above report inter alia is the issue on conflicts of interests. The
report exposes the holes of the current ways in which member governments appoint
their delegates to IMO meetings. Brazil, for example, sent to MEPC 71 five advisers
from Vale S.A, a multinational company with substantial shipping interest while the
Marshall Islands appointed twelve delegates eight of which were employees of the
International Registry Inc Group, a private shipping registry (IMO, MEPC 71/INF.1).
Such examples can be easily found at other IMO meetings which were recently held 6.
TI recommends that IMO should consider the introduction of requirements for
member State representatives to hold an official public mandate as members of their
domestic civil service and to demonstrate an absence of conflicts of interest in their
role as national delegates.
In order to ensure a sound policy making process, great attention should be paid to the
actors who participate there. Hesse (2018) states that, since governance is the process
of adopting and implementing policy, an analysis of governance is to focus on the
actors involved in that process as well as the structures set in place to arrive at and
implement the policy. In this sense, it is much worthy of looking into participants in
IMO rule-making as well as their related matters including participation, rule of law,
accountability, effectiveness and efficiency and transparency. TI, warning IMO of the
undesirable compositions of the participants at its meetings, expressed a concern about
the possibility of private companies’ resistance of clean technology which may require
long-term investment.
TI’s analysis and recommendation entail that, in order to ensure the public interest in
the policy making of IMO on a fair basis, the private companies including particularly
6

See appendix 1 to this dissertation.
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ship owners or operators should be ruled out from the IMO decision making processes.
At a cursory glance it may sound reasonable but the reality is much more complex than
what it seems like.
2.1 Inseparable relation between shipping and economic growth
Shipping derives from the demands of the trade. It cannot create its own demands. Ups
and downs of shipping always depend on those of trade. Good examples thereabout
can be easily found from a glance which is given to what is going on in the global
economy and international seaborne trade these days.

Table 5. World economic growth, 2016-2017 (Annual percentage change in GDP)
Source: Author compiled from UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2018, p.4.
The world maritime transportation gained momentum in 2017. It expanded at 4% in
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volumes, which is the fastest increase in recent five years. This increase came from the
world economic growth. Global industrial activity and manufacturing increased in
2017 by 2.8%, up from 0.2% in 2016. In China, industrial production was up at 6.5%,
while Brazil witnessed 2.4% increase in 2017. As a result the world witnessed a
considerable upswing in GDP with 3.1% increase in 2017, up from 2.5% in 2016 as
shown in Table 5 (UNCTAD, 2018, p.3).

Table 6. International seaborne trade growth (millions of tons loaded), 2016-2017
Source: Author compiled from UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2018, p.5.
The recent global economic growth brought prosperity to shipping. The volume of the
global seaborne trade reached 10.3 billion tons in 2016. This figure increased upto
10.7 billion tons in 2017, reflecting additional 411 million tons as shown in Table 6.
Each type of cargo transported by ship also saw continuous increase in recent years as
listed in Table 7. All these upward trend led to growth in world fleet capacity. After
five years of decelerating growth, the world fleet experienced increase by additional
42 million gross tons in 2017 responding to the trade growth, as presented in Figure 1.

13

Figure 1. Annual growth of world fleet and seaborne trade, 2000-2017 (percentage)
Source: UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2018, p.23.
The facts and figures clearly illustrate the close relations between shipping and trade.
IMO aims to create a “regulatory framework for the shipping industry that is fair,
effective, universally adopted and implemented.” (IMO, 2019)7 IMO, in its Assembly
resolution A.1110(30), states that its mission is to promote safe, secure,
environmentally sound, efficient and sustainable shipping through cooperation.
Efficient and sustainable shipping that IMO refers to means economically beneficial
and, thus, consistently growing shipping. In order for this mission to be fulfilled, IMO
cannot help but fully consult and consider the commercial interests such as, in
particular, ship owners, ship operators, seafarers agencies, etc. and reflect their views
in their technical regulations.

7

Further information is given in the IMO website: http://www.imo.org/en/About/Pages/Default.aspx
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Table 7. World seaborne trade, 2016-2017 (Type of cargo, country group and region)
Source: Author compiled from UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2018, p.6

15

2.2 Regulatory framework in shipping
In general, maritime regulations can be divided into three distinctive categories:
technical, economic and social regulations, under which they can be further divided
into sub-groups such as the regulations developed by professional entities and those by
governmental agencies (Ma, 2018, p.138). As shown in Figure 2, shipping utilizes or is
controlled by rules and regulations of all these three categories. Yet the shipping
standards set by IMO fall under the category of technical regulations.

Figure 2.

Regulatory framework in shipping

Source: Author compiled from Ma Shuo (2018). Maritime Economics. Class handout, Dalian
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Maritime University, Dalian, China.

Technical regulations are standards set by the industry for the purpose of its own
well-being. The development of these standards requires professional expertise. The
best example is classification rules and regulations. At international level, IMO is the
only body responsible for technical requirements of shipping. These requirements are
transposed into the domestic standards by governments.
Shipping is also bound by regulations established to achieve economic objectives. The
examples are the Convention on the Arrest of Ships (1999) and the Convention on
Maritime Liens and Mortgages (1993) adopted by the NU Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD). Quite recently the World Trade Organization (WTO)’s
involvement in shipping is notable. Today it is anticipated that WTO’s principles
including market access 8 , national treatment 9 and most-favored nation 10 will be
widely applied to shipping sooner or later. Regulations of the Organization of
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) are applied in the shipbuilding
aspect in the field of government subsidy for the shipyard credit. Nowadays efforts are
being made to eliminate all official subsidy in favor of a national shipbuilding
industry.
Some maritime regulations address social issues. As for international instruments, the
most important bodies are the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) at
professional level and the International Labor Organization (ILO) at governmental
8

This principle requires that illegal cargo protection should be prohibited. Members to WTO must
make sure that their laws, rules and regulations are transparent, their markets are open and all trade
barriers, tangible or intangible, are removed. Open market policies must be promoted with
development and economic reforms encouraged. Thus, a foreseeable and constantly expanded market
entry can be expected (Chang et al., 2008, p.8).
9

It is one of the WTO principles that requires fair treatment between foreign companies and national
ones (Chang et al., 2008, p.8).
10

It allows for no discrimination between foreign companies. All the members to WTO are given
equal most favored nation status and national treatment. Fair competition is to be guaranteed (Chang
et al., 2008, p.8).
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level. ITF’s greatest concern is maritime transport although it deals with all the modes
of transport. It objects to “flag of convenience” and promotes the remuneration
scheme for the minimum salary of seafarers. ILO is involved in setting standards for
workers’ decent working condition. The best example of its regulations is the Maritime
Labor Convention (2006) (MLC) which sets a number of standards on seafarers’
contract, minimum age, recruitment and placement, wages, rest hours, repatriation,
entitlement to leave, manning level, etc.
All these above rules and regulations cover a broad spectrum of safety, security,
environmental protection, efficiency and effectiveness. In particular IMO’s technical
regulations not only apply safety principles but also reflect the industry’s views as
these regulations are the standards of the industry itself. Therefore, such regulations
should be developed on the basis of the proper balance between safety and benefit
goals. If there are too many regulations without reflecting the actual requirements of
the industry, they will hinder sustainable shipping.
In fact, no shipping, no maritime regulations. There is no considering maritime safety
concept without sustainable shipping. If the regulations are seen by the industry as
unnecessary burden on the shipping, there is no need for governments to meet in IMO
forums, for they have obligations to protect their national economy’s interest. In any
case, phenomena arise only when substance exists.
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CHAPTER 3.

ANALYSIS TO PRIVATE INTERESTS’ ROLE IN IMO

The easiest solution to the problem raised by TI in respect of conflicts of interests may
be that the maritime players should be separated from the maritime judges at IMO
meetings and be given little access to IMO policy-making to ensure transparent and
fair policies. As mentioned above, however, complex sciotechnical factors including
efficiency as well as safety are entangled with each other in shipping. It is not so
simple to segregate players from judges in the maritime forums unlike in the sports
playgrounds. Is interference of commercial entities in the maritime policy-making so
undesirable for maritime development indeed? In order to answer this question, it is
needed to look into the role that the industry players play in IMO forum.
3.1

Advantages in private interests’ contribution

The Convention on the International Maritime Organization (1948) (IMO Convention),
in Article 1, reads inter alia as follows:
“The purposes of the Organization are:
(a) to provide machinery for co-operation among Governments in the field of
governmental regulations and practices relating to technical matters of all kinds
affecting shipping engaged in international trade, and to encourage the general
adopting of the highest practicable standards in matters concerning maritime
safety and efficiency of navigation; ”
The above provision clearly stipulates that safety is the priority of IMO’s work. But
this safety has no meaning unless it is in good balance with cost-effectiveness. And
this balance comes from the active participation of private interest groups in the IMO
policy-making.
In IMO forums, quite a few examples can be found in which commercial groups
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contribute to establishment of effective mechanisms. In August 2016, for example, the
ship owners and operators’ group including BIMCO, ICS, the International
Association of Dry Cargo Shipowners (INTERCARGO), the International
Association of Independent Tanker Owners (INTERTANKO) and the World Shipping
Council (WSC) submitted document MEPC 70/7/8, suggesting that MEPC should
develop a roadmap to determine a possible IMO fair share contribution to GHG
reduction in accordance with the Paris Agreement. In the previous year, ICS had
proposed that IMO should develop an Intended IMO Determined Contribution on
GHG reduction for the international shipping sector as a whole, taking account of the
language used in the Paris Agreement to describe contributions that governments will
make in the form of Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). This
suggestion preluded resolution MEPC.304(72) which was a demonstration of IMO’s
substantial commitment to UN’s SDG on climate change. The resolution also clarifies
maritime sector’s sincere efforts for fair share in the implementation of the Paris
Agreement as against the serious fact that many parties to the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) had handed in INDCs which
announced that their national economies are currently unable to commit to absolute
CO2 reductions in the immediate future due to their population increase projections
and their legitimate desire for sustainable economic development. The above valuable
suggestion which contributed to the birth of the initial GHG reduction strategy was
likely to be come up with only by such on-the-spot players as ICS or BIMCO which
have specific capability of giving a keen insight into the strange relations between the
ideal and reality.
TI’s report in question, noting that IMO announced the initial strategy for GHG
emission reduction, states as follows:
The announcement was widely welcomed and will trigger some immediate
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decarbonisation measures. However, a revised, final strategy will not be adopted
until 2023 and the next five years will see the IMO’s Member States enter
politically charged and technically complex negotiations to agree a final GHG
deal.
The above statement may sound like one-sided comments without taking account of
the practicability of the GHG emission reduction. Neither UN’s SDG on climate
change nor the Paris Agreement’s target can be achieved without full preparation
including data collection and analysis. Therefore, the Working Group on Reduction of
GHG emissions from ships, organized at MEPC 70, acknowledged that the IMO’s
strategy for GHG emission reduction would build on the various measures that have
already been adopted and implemented by IMO member States in relation to the
reduction of GHG emissions from international shipping including EEDI and SEEMP
in force since 2013, the immediate determination of the data collection system and
various technical cooperation activities and major projects. In this context, the
Working Group agreed that a Fourth IMO GHG study should be carried out to include
data covering the period from 2012 to 2018, thus bridging the gap between the Third
IMO GHG Study and the data collection system (IMO, MEPC 70/WP.7). IMO had
already made public the Third IMO GHG Study 2014 in July 2014 including the GHG
emission related data from 2007-2012 as presented in Figure 3. If the overall data
covering the period from 2013 to 2018 is collected and compared with the Third IMO
GHG Study data, a comprehensive picture will be provided to clarify how effectively
the post-2013 anti-GHG measures of IMO worked and what steps should be further
taken to ensure that IMO’s fair share is not only good-looking but also tangible.
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Figure 3. CO2 emissions by ship type (international shipping only) for all years
2007-2012
Source: IMO (2014). MEPC 67/INF.3, p.20

Any of goals for maritime safety and marine environmental protection should be
realistic, practical and achievable. As shipping is, so far, the most energy efficient
mode of transport, unrealistic contribution to reducing the shipping sector’s absolute
CO2 emissions could result in a shift to less energy efficient transport modes. This
would clearly be counterproductive to reduction of the world’s total CO2 inventory and
the achievement of INDCs (MEPC 70/7/8, p.2). The revised strategy’s putting off until
2023 results from the inevitability of sufficient period for the scientific and economic
research project, rather than IMO member States’ lack of accountability or conflicts of
interests.
Industry groups’ contributions to IMO are also visible in other areas including safety,
security, etc. BIMCO, for example, has been very active in IMO’s work and sponsored
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or co-sponsored submissions on a number of topical issues including air emissions,
ballast water, life saving devices, human response to piracy, stability code, Electronic
Chart Display & Information System (ECDIS), recycling, ship construction standards,
etc. (IMO, 2015)11.
ICS’s devotion to IMO’s work is also notable. As the principal global trade association
for shipowners whose combined merchant fleet accounts for 80% of the world gross
tonnage, it is concerned with all regulatory, operational and legal issues, as well as
employment affairs. It attends all IMO meetings, except TC meetings and submits a
number of proposals aiming at improvement of IMO mechanisms. It participated in
over 18 working/draft groups and over fifteen correspondence groups, as of March
2015, with contribution to improvement of IMO instruments (IMO, 2015)11. Prior the
critical adoption of the initial strategy of GHG emission reduction by IMO in April
2018, ICS played an important role in persuading governments to develop this
ambitious response to the Paris Agreement. ICS’s proposal in document MEPC 70/7/8
which was submitted to IMO, just a few weeks after the adoption of the Paris
Agreement, encouraged the industry to submit various detailed proposals to IMO on
GHG emission reduction during 2017 (ICS, 2018, p.10-11). That is why the above
analysis points out that ICS’s MEPC 70/7/8 proved a prelude to resolution
MEPC.304(72).
All these contributions were clearly supported by the private interest groups’ sufficient
expertise and experience gained from the reality. Some member States include private
company employees into their national delegations to IMO meetings probably because
they believe that they are likely to provide governmental officials with helpful
information about what is going on in the reality.
As a matter of fact, IMO’s history is regarded as a story about its painstaking efforts
11

Further information is given in the IMO website: https://docs.imo.org/Category.aspx?cid=746
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not only to promote maritime safety but also to protect the shipping industry’s interest.
It is easily illustrated by the components of the IMO treaties as shown in Figure 4. For
example, some treaties such as liability conventions highlight protection of the
shipowners’ interest. In this context, the active participation by private interest groups
in IMO policy-making processes is considered inevitable.

Figure 4. Categories of IMO treaties
Source: Author complied from Proshanto. K. Mucherjee (2018). International maritime law,
legal systems & conventions. Class handout, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian,
China.

Du (2018) classifies IMO’s legal framework relating to environment issues into three
categories including pollution prevention, preparedness and response and liability and
compensation. Under the liability and compensation mechanism, IMO adopted the
International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1992), the
International Convention for Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage and
Supplementary Fund and the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker
Oil Pollution Damage all of which purport to ensure shipowners’ interest.
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In general, the doctrine of restitutio in integrum is predominant, particularly, with
respect to environmental pollution, regardless of proof of tort. However, this doesn’t
apply to the maritime sector at the same degree as the other sectors because of the
above liability conventions of IMO which aim to maintain the sustainable growth of
the shipping industry. This example clearly illustrates that one of IMO’s greatest
concern is to provide the maritime legal framework which protect the interest of the
industry.
3.2 Disadvantages in private interests’ involvement
Then, have the private interest groups made only perfect contributions to maritime
safety promotion and marine environmental protection so far? Unfortunately, answers
which are frequently heard indicate “No”. As a matter of fact, TI’s concerns about
what is happening in IMO have much in common with those of the public which has so
often seen the conflicts of interests in IMO forums. If a keener insight is given to what
the industry personnel are doing in IMO forums, serious problems are looming.
3.2.1

Private interest in the GHG reduction

TI’s report expresses concerns about the private companies’ involvement in IMO
policy-making because they are likely to resist the adoption of new safety or
environmental protection measures if they judge those measures to be costly. When
discussion was made to decide the quantitative target on GHG emission reduction in
the Intersessional Working Group on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships,
Kiribati et al. proposed zero GHG emission by 2035, Belgium et al. proposed 90%
efficiency improvement and 70% volume reduction, pursuing efforts to 100%
reduction by 2050, ICS et al. proposed maintaining emission volumes below the 2008
level and 50% efficiency improvement by 2050 and Japan proposed 40% efficiency
improvement by 2030 and 50% volume reduction by 2060 (IMO, MEPC 72/7/3). As
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shown in Figure 5, the scenarios of ICS and Japan are less ambitious than the others.

Figure 5. CO2 emissions scenarios proposed by some States
Source: IMO (2018). MEPC 72/7/3, p.2
Japan brought forward its proposal at MEPC 72 as well. Noting that analysis of
UNCTAD Review of Maritime Transport 2017 shows the energy efficiency
improvement by 30% in global shipping in 2015 compared to the 2008 level, Japan
considered that speed reduction resulting from excess fleet and market restraint
following the financial crisis accounts for the majority of such efficiency
improvement by 2015. This analysis indicates that such market effect is temporary
and, thus, the energy efficiency will not remain at the 2015 level in the future without
any further policy measures. Based on this diagnosis, Japan proposed 50% volume
reduction by 2060 as presented in Table 8. Nevertheless, MEPC 72 adopted the
initial strategy aiming at 50% reduction by 2050 compared to the 2008’s levels (IMO,
MEPC.304(72)).
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Table 8. Efficiency improvement estimated by Japan
Source: IMO (2018). MEPC 72/7/3, p.3
Japan’s intention was less ambitious than that of the adopted strategy as well as other
States’ proposals. It is true that Japan justified its proposal in a scientific and accurate
way. However, a question is raised whether its proposal had been influenced by the
private interests who feared long-term investment into GHG emission reduction, as
against the fact that 5 among Japanese delegates at MEPC 72 came from the Japaneses
Shipowners’ Association (IMO, MEPC 72/INF.1, p.22).
3.2.2

Undesirable impact of private interests on IMO’s work as a whole

It may be quite reckless to jump with the above example alone to the hasty conclusion
that private interest negatively impacts on IMO’s decision-making. If, however, more
undivided attention is paid to what is happening in broader parts of maritime sector
including the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) and the other committees of IMO, it
will become clear that there is no denying the serious consequences produced by the
commercial agencies’ over-interference in IMO’s rule-making.
Aiming at zero casualty
IMO, in order to realize its teleology, adopted a number of instruments including
conventions, codes, guidelines, etc. Almost all of those instruments were deeply
related to marine casualties. Safety, and sometimes even environmental protection, is
briefly regarded as being free from accidents. Thus, the public opinion is considered to
be “the fewer accidents, the safer, cleaner and more efficient oceans.” In this regard,
IMO’s work was, is and will be focused on minimizing and finally eliminating marine
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casualties. In order to realize the dream of zero casualty, IMO adopted significant
anti-accident measures whenever it witnessed a serious marine disaster. It is
well-known that the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1974)
(SOLAS), IMO’s most important safety instrument, was derived from its 1914 version
which was born as a collection of the lessons drawn from the Titanic Disaster while
the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (1973)
(MARPOL), IMO’s most significant environmental protection instrument, was
adopted following the Torrey Canyon Disaster.

Figure 6. Average number of major oil spills per year (over 700 tonnes)
Source: Du Dachang (2018). Marine Environment Protection Standards. Class handout,
Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, China

Then, are these instruments really effective in the fulfillment of IMO’s mission and
vision? To answer this question, many studies were made of the efficacy of IMO
instruments some of which proved satisfactory. For example, the average yearly
number of oil spill incidents which used to be reportedly 25.2 in the 1970s reduced to
3.1 in the 2000s as shown in Figure 6 (Du, 2018, p.13). The amount of spilled oil also
witnessed considerable decrease during the MARPOL implemented period as shown
in Figure 7. The public believe that MARPOL is credited with contributing to the
substantial decrease of oil pollution accidents. Recently MARPOL Annex VI’s
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efficacy is considered substantial. In 2015, for instance, the CO2 emission from the
global shipping reduced by 8% compared with 2008 level, in spite of a 30% increase in
maritime trade (ICS, 2018, p.8).

Figure 7. Oil spillage from 1970 to 2015 including tanker accidents
Source: Du Dachang (2018). Marine Environment Protection Standards. Class handout,
Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, China

Shipping losses also shows the continuously declining trend as shown in Figure 8. In
particular, 2018 saw more than 50% reduction year-on-year from 98 to 46 in terms of
frequency (AGCS, 2019) 12 . It is out of question that these achievements are
inconceivable without IMO’s safety instruments including SOLAS and its associated
codes and guidelines. However, serious problems are found to be hidden between the
lines of those instruments if more detailed analysis is given to how they are born by,
and going with the industry.

12

Further information is given in the AGCS website:
https://www.agcs.allianz.com/news-and-insights/reports/shipping-safety.html
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Figure 8. Declining trend in shipping losses from 2008 to 2017
Source: AGCS (2018). Safety and Shipping Review 2018. Munich, Germany: Author.

ISM Code－a powerful tool for safety or just piece of paper for formality?
Bhattacharya (2012), after studying the effectiveness of the International
Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (the
ISM Code), concluded that there is a considerable difference between the stances of
managers and seafarers in the implementation of the ISM Code and as such a wide
gap between the expected outcome of the Code implementation and the practice.
Attributing the existing shortcomings of the ISM Code to non-participation of
seafarers in safety policy making which is traced back to their short-term contracts
with their companies, he recommended to consider ways of improving underlying
socioeconomic conditions of seafarers which could be the first step towards breaking
the vicious circle of little trust, blame and scepticism between employers and
employees. His assessment of the ISM Code and subsequent recommendations are
worthy of in-depth consideration. Indeed, the ISM Code is considered one of the best
examples which illustrate the side-effect of private interests’ involvement in the IMO
rule-making process.
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The adoption of the ISM Code was traced back to document MSC 46/18/7 submitted
in the early 1980s by private interest groups such as ICS, INTERTANKO, etc. which
attributed the frequent marine casualties to poor safety management system (SMS).
In this context, ICS et al. developed a voluntary guideline, Code of Good
Management Practice in Safe Ship Operation and subsequently the UK Department
of Transport brought out a guidance titled Good Ship Management for the
UK-flagged ships. Both of these were the precursory instruments to the ISM Code
which came up with the idea of self-regulation (Bhattacharya, 2009, pp.29-32).
Throughout the 1980s IMO witnessed continuous discussions on self-regulation at its
meetings and, finally, in 1987, saw the Herald of Free Enterprise disaster in which
188 lives were lost in the English Channel. As it was a UK-flagged passenger ferry,
Her Majesty’s Stationary Office (HMSO) investigated the casualty and produced a
report with damning evidences which blamed the ferry company’s management for
the disaster. It stated that “the Board of Directors did not appreciate their
responsibility for the safe management of their ships” and put a stress on their
repeated failures in providing adequate support to their ships’ masters for operational
safety (HMSO, 1987, p. 14). The HMSO report speeded up the drafting of a new
IMO instrument which aimed at SMS improvement of shipping companies. Further,
the social pressure from the outside world such as insurance companies urged IMO
to take tangible actions to prevent the frequently occurring marine accidents. Finally,
IMO adopted the ISM Code by its Assembly resolution A.741(18) in November 17,
1993. The Code required managers to assume greater responsibilities for their
companies’ SMS. Heretofore, ship inspectors from the maritime authorities had been
required to ensure statutory compliance mainly through inspections. But the ISM
Code showed a shift from the earlier control mechanism to the self-checking and
self-regulating based system. It required management to monitor their ships and
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report to their flag State thereabout. This was a meaningful step towards establishing
the link between the flag State authority, the ship operator and the ship. IMO, greatly
hopeful of the ISM Code’s contribution to the global maritime safety and marine
environmental protection, made the Code mandatory in 1998 by introducing a new
chapter IX into SOLAS.
However, it was widely argued across the industry, from the beginning, that the
expected improvement had not been enjoyed since the ISM Code was implemented.
In 2001, for example, an international study used more than 3,000 survey
questionnaires to analyze opinions of seafarers and shore-based stakeholders on the
usefulness of the ISM Code and found out that seafarers were more dismissive of the
values of the Code than their managers (Anderson, 2002). Another study showed that
80% of shipping companies regarded the Code merely as a piece of paper licensing
to run their business. It pointed out that managers failed to see the safety goals as
long-term economic benefits and, therefore, did not see the need to provide sufficient
resources for shipboard safety (Lloyd, 2003).
In this context, IMO conducted another study between 2004 and 2005 by using
questionnaires as well. IMO Secretary General established a group of independent
experts selected from administrations, organizations, academia and the shipping
industry and tasked it to analyse the impact of the ISM Code. The group, after
finishing their work, submitted to MSC 81 document MSC 81/17/1 reporting that
about 99% of the 3,109 respondents who received questionnaires were supportive of
the ISM Code. However, the group regarded this positive result questionable and
acknowledged that this was because, due to the methodological shortcomings, the
majority of the respondents came from those who had generally enjoyed some
benefit from the implementation of the ISM Code (MSC 81/17/1).
Conflicts of interests adumbrated in the ISM Code
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Taking into account the lessons drawn from the above methodology applied by IMO,
another study was conducted of two shipping companies between 2006 and 2009.
Both were European based with good reputations. 20 managerial officials and 67
seafarers from the two companies were interviewed and voyages of different flagged
ships were researched into for 49 days. The study revealed that there was a yawning
gap in the perceptions between the managers and seafarers. While interviewees from
the both managements claimed that their SMSs were robust with adequate resources
for supporting their seafaring colleagues, the interviewed seafarers regarded their
SMS helpless. They complained that all the information in the documented
instructions and procedures are merely generic and not ship-specific. They were also
critical about too much obsession with paperwork. The most serious eye-catcher in
the study outcomes was that the managements attributed the most common cause for
marine accidents to seafarers’ non-compliance although the incident reporting
policies in both the companies recognized the importance of the no-blame culture.
This led to seafarers’ fear of being blamed for shipboard incidents and losing jobs
which resulted in nonfulfillment of the reporting procedures. The study revealed a
number of serious findings in the huge discrepancy between what the ISM Code
seeks for and what is happening in the practice (Bhattacharya, 2012).
Reviewing the results of all the damning reports of the ISM Code studies, Baumler
(2018) indicates that the ISM Code’s impacts on seafarers are featured by, inter alia,
exclusion of seafarers from their own safety management, crew abilities and pride
downgraded, forced engagement of seafarers to comply with their companies’ agenda,
permanent threat by audit and control, fear in reporting, job insecurity, loss of
autonomy and control on work organization and impair motivation of senior officers
and rest of staff. His statement constitutes accurate assessment. The cause for these
serious problems was attempted to be found in the composition of the ISM Code
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itself. It was argued that the Code appeared to limit the role of seafarers to blindly
following the procedural requirement enforced by the managers. The Code does not
refer to the need for involving seafarers in the companies’ decision making process.
It, for example, does not mention the importance of involving seafarers in the risk
assessment process. The lack of seafarers’ input in the organizations’ risk assessment
is also reflected by the popularity of the use of commonplace SMSs in the maritime
industry. On several occasions the industry press stated that shipowners could buy
readily available generic SMSs for immediate implementation. Such SMSs are
generally produced by commercial entities which come up with standard
ship-operating policies and procedures along with non-specific checklists and forms
that fit a wide variety of maritime organizations and trades. They do not take into
account the specific requirements of the organizations or the ships or acknowledge
the importance of the seafarers’ views in the decision making process. Thus,
seafarers are provided with few opportunity to promoting their competence, training
and motivation. Furthermore, they have little support from trade unions at the
workplace (Bhattacharya, 2009, pp.52-53).
Despite the above, no appropriate action has been taken so far. As shown in Table 9,
IMO amended the ISM Code on several occasions but failed to revise it in
compliance with the actual requirements of the practice. Rather, the amendments to
the Code resulted in intensifying the absolute role of the management while ignoring
seafarers’ participation in safety policy-making. For example, MSC resolution
MSC.273(85), overestimated the managers’ responsibility for risk identification by
amending paragraph 1.2.2.2 of the Code, for shipboard operations by amending
section 7, for establishing procedures to respond to the potential emergency
shipboard situations by amending paragraph 8.1 and for internal audits on board and
ashore by amending paragraph 12.1 but never addressed the essential problems

34

arising in the implementation of the ISM Code.
ISM Code/
Amendments

ISM Code

Resolution

A.741(18)

Adoption
date

17/11/1993

Effective
date

Amendments
to the Code

Revokes
A.647(16)
& 680(17).
Mandatory
under new
Chapter IX
of SOLAS

01/07/1998

2000
Amendments

MSC.104(73)

05/12/2000

01/07/2002

New Part A (1.1
definition,
Chap.7), Part B
(Chap.13, new
Chap.14-16),
Appendix(forms
of DOC, SMC,
Interim DOC
and Interim
SMC)

2004
Amendments

MSC.179(79)

10/12/2004

01/07/2006

Appendix(DOC,
SMC)

01/01/2009

Appendix(DOC,
SMC, Interim
DOC, Interim
SMC)

01/07/2010

Part A(1, 5, 7, 8,
9, 10, 12), Part
B(13, 14),
Appendix
(SMC)

2005
Amendments

2008
Amendments

MSC.195(80)

MSC.273(85)

20/05/2005

04/12/2008

Remarks

Refer to
A.913(22)

Refer to
A.913(22)

Table 9. History of the amendment to the ISM Code
Source: IMO (3 December 2008). International Management Code for the Safe Operation of
Ships and for Pollution Prevention. adopted by IMO MSC (MSC 273(85)). London:
Author.

The above phenomenon adumbrates a picture of the conflicts of interests in IMO.
Shipping is typical of complex sociotechnical systems. Any consideration, therefore,
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require not only an analytic but also synthetic look at all the factors in shipping from
machines to humans, from independence to dependence and from hierarchy to
network. Every element in the shipping system seems to be distinctive with its own
clear bounds but, in fact, is interrelated and interacts. When looking into any system,
it is important to fully consider the three key elements including humans, equipment
and organization. Humans briefly include employers and employees while equipment
indicates machines, facilities, installations and other necessary hardware. These two
elements constitute resources of the system. However, it is not enough to put an
emphasis on these two elements alone, because the system is able to make up only
with the realization of the interrelations between humans, between equipment and
between humans and equipment. Thus, proper attention should be paid to this
important concept－organization. The system’s important components and their
relations are illustrated in the SHELL model as shown in Figure 9. In the model the
most worthwhile to consider is the link between livewares i.e.the relations between
employers and employees. Employers should fully demonstrate their commitment by
providing the employees with sufficient resources including decent working and
living conditions and with sufficient opportunities to participate in the companies’
policy making. However, in the practice the employers’ behavior is so often far from
the ideal. The above analysis of the ISM Code implementation shows that managers
tend to assume that they have right to all-the-decision-making of their organizations,
regarding their seafarers as just human machines who have only obligations to
adhere to those decisions. When considering safety, shore-based managers assumes a
neighbor stance while seafarers takes a user stance. Therefore, the user friendliness
of the system cannot be ensured unless seafarers fully participate in SMS policy
making. It is true that the ISM Code stipulates the overriding authority of masters13
13

Paragraph 5.2 of the Code provides that the company should establish in the SMS that the master
has the overriding authority and the responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety and
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but this authority is confined to onboard decision making. In the current situation,
both of the managers and seafarers have no alternative but to suffer from the
burdensome formalistic paperwork. In Bhattacharya (2012, p.4)’s study, it was found
that, as ships remained out of the ship managers’ reach for most of the time, the
management lacked the scope to conduct physical surveillance which is why they
were uncertain about the practice followed on the ships. It implies why SMS is being
implemented through bureaucracy.

Figure 9. SHELL model
Source: Raphael Baumler (2018). Human factors in maritime safety and environment
protection. Class handout, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, China.

All these serious problems inherent in the ISM Code are traced back to how the Code
was proposed and adopted. When the world witnessed seriously frequent marine
accidents in the 1980s and the 1990s and, therefore, the social pressure urged the

pollution prevention and request the company’s assistance if necessary. Further, this provision clarifies
that the master’s authority should be contained in the onboard SMS.
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maritime sector to take appropriate actions, the shipping industry invented a cheap
solution which was made of some pieces of paper that is the ISM Code 14. The Code
endows managers with a great right to control on SMS as well as their seafarers
while it forces the unilateral obligation on seafarers to mechanically adhere to their
managers’ instructions. This is based on the stereotyped idea that managers are
always clever and seafarers are always stupid. If the Code is read between the lines,
the bureaucratic perception is looming that all the marine disasters are attributable to
seafarers’ misdoings and, thus, the companies should reinforce their control over
their employees.

Figure 10. Three types of preventive measures
Source: Raphael Baumler (2018). Human factors in maritime safety and environment
protection. Class handout, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, China.
14

This solution is illustrated in Figure 10. Among the three pictures presented, the first one is the
cheapest preventive measures alluding to the ISM Code. The improvement in equipment alluded to by
the second picture is considered the most effective but causes additional cost while regulating
circumstances as illustrated in the third picture may have a negative impact on the companies’ earning.
Thus, the cheapest and easiest solution seems to control the operators’ behavior, for example, through
paperwork or over-regulations, just like the ISM Code.
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Lack of voice from LDCs and SIDSs
Unbalanced representation exist not only between managements and seafarers but
also between member States in IMO forums. While private interests from,
particularly, developed States such as OECD members exercise full representation at
IMO meetings, either public or private interests from the Least Developed States
(LDCs) and the Small Island Developing States (SIDSs) may suffer from insufficient
representation due to their budgetary constraints. Such States often lack the means to
maintain their permanent missions to IMO or to send suitably large delegations. TI
expressed its concern that this can result in contingent problems of a lack of expertise
(TI, 2018, p.24).
Such barriers to full participation are not confined to LDCs or SIDSs. Though the UK
takes its home team advantage of having the IMO headquarters in its capital, many
other member States find it hard to send a sufficient number of their representatives,
perhaps due to financial burdens. For example, while the UK was represented by 15
civil servants and four private industry representatives at MEPC 71, Barbados, Sierra
Leone, Tonga and Ukraine, to take four examples among many, had one representative
each (MEPC 71/INF.1). This often leads to lack of representation in IMO. Because the
proceedings of committees, sub-committees and working groups take place
concurrently, IMO meetings need a significant number of staff with relevant technical
expertise. However many member States fail to be represented effectively across these
forums as shown in Table 1015. It raises another concern that IMO instruments may be
partially influenced by a small handful of advantageous States.
15

This table has been developed from the analysis of IMO documents, issued in 2017, including SDC
5/INF.1, MSC 93/INF.1 and MEPC 71/INF.1. The unbalanced representation is more notable in the
sub-committees the main function of which is to carry out technical work. It implies that LDCs or
SIDSs are provided with few opportunities to take part in technical consideration in IMO forums. It is
perhaps because of their lack of financial budget as well as technical expertise. They appear to attend
the committees’ meetings by sending a small number of delegations mainly due to their national
reputation rather than due to their public interest.
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States
Meetings

Barbados
China
DPRK
Japan
Russia
Sierra Leon
Tonga
UK
Ukraine
US

SDC 5 (5)*
a
b
0
0
10
15
2
2
13
18
2
6
0
0
0
0
1
15
0
1
4
11

c
0
5
1
4
3
0
0
3
0
3

MSC 93 (3)*
a
b
c
0
4
0
1
18
3
3
4
0
8
32
3
1
8
3
0
1
0
0
1
0
4
23
3
0
1
0
7
20
3

MEPC 71 (5)*
a
b
c
0
1
0
12
20
4
0
2
0
11
48
4
6
13
4
0
1
0
3
1
0
4
17
3
0
1
0
4
16
5

(...)*: the number of working/drafting groups at each meeting
a: the number of documents that are submitted
b: the number of the participants at each meeting
c: the number of working/drafting groups attended
Table 10. Representation of exemplary member States in some IMO forums
Source: Author compiled from IMO (2017).

Distortion of the spirits of IMO instruments
The Code of the International Standards and Recommended Practices for a Safety
Investigation into a Marine Casualty or Marine Incident (CIC) in paragraph 1.1
stipulates that marine safety investigations do not seek to apportion blame or
determine liability, emphasizing that its object is to prevent marine casualties and
marine incidents in the future. But the blame cultures still remains the norm
throughout the shipping industry. When discussing the issue of the blame culture
during Bhattacharya’s study, managers always insisted that their companies ran a
no-blame culture. But the study revealed that the practice is quite different. For
example, the questions in the reporting forms of both the companies chosen for the
study were found to focus on identifying seafarer’ flaws. As a result, seafarers felt
fearful that by reporting incidents they would invite trouble. The interviewed
seafarers said, if an accident occurs, “Who goes to jail? It’s me.” (Bhattacharya, 2009,
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p.195-202). Their fears proved not idle. He (2009) noted that seafarers are relatively
vulnerable group who are easy to be criticized compared with ashore managers and
ship surveyors. In 2012, the Seafarers Rights International carried out a survey of
3,480 seafarers of 68 nationalities to look into the criminalization of seafarers. In the
survey 24% of masters and 8% of seafarers said that they had been faced with
criminal charges. The interviews with them indicated that serious problems really
exist although the criminalization is not so rampant. The interviews found that 91%
of seafarers were not provided with interpretation services, 90% did not have legal
presentation, 88% had no legal right to explanation, 80% felt intimidated or
threatened, 81% considered themselves to be treated unfairly and 85% were
concerned about criminalization (ITF, 2015)16.
It is true that it is an important function of a sovereign State to punish criminals.
Such an enforcement system contributes to effective implementation of IMO
instruments as well. The IMO Instruments Implementation Code (III Code) in
paragraph 21.6 provides that flag States should take all necessary measures to secure
observance of IMO instruments by ships, entities and persons under their jurisdiction
by providing, in national legislation, for penalties of adequate severity to discourage
violations of international instruments by individuals with certificates under their
authority and by instituting proceedings－after an investigation has been conducted
－against such individuals who violated international rules and standards. But in
practise these requirements are applied on an impartial basis.
The traditional blame culture is based on the belief that systems are safe and,
therefore, any accident results from human errors. However, within complex
sociotechnical systems human errors do not originate from individuals but are

16

Further information is given in the SRI website :
http://seafarersrights.org/seafarers-subjects/fair-treatment/
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symptoms of the ever present latent conditions inherent in the complexity of
organizational factors. For example, the surprising fact that ships carry more than
90% of global trade with seafarers onboard who account for only 2% of transport
workers apparently provides a picture of the high efficiency of shipping
(Schröder-Hinrichs, 2019). The general public, however, frequently fail to look into
its hidden meaning － fatigue. A number of marine accidents are considered
attributable to seafarers’ fatigue which is again attributable to their organizations’
working systems.

Figure 11. Reason’s model
Source: FAO (2001). Safety at sea as an integral part of fisheries management. Rome:
Author.

The relations between these factors and accidents are properly illustrated by Reason’s
accident causation model. As shown in Figure 11, Reason (1990)’s model
recommends that accident investigators look into latent failures which are invisible
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but very significant. In the model, the first layer represents defensive measures that
are designed to mitigate the unsafe acts. The second and third layers indicate the
unsafe acts and their relevant preconditions. The fourth layer stands for line
management deficiencies such as insufficient training, improper maintenance, etc.
The fifth includes errors of all high-level rule-makers such as regulators, designers,
manufacturers, employers, etc (FAO, 2001, p.4). His model starts with organizational
factors including decision-making and generic organizational processes. In this
regard, marine safety investigations require delving into the basic organizational
policies (such as strategy, rules and regulations and working culture) and processes
(such as designing, constructing, operating, maintaining, communicating, manning,
training and managing) of shipping that make up maritime organizational factors
containing latent conditions most likely to pose a threat against the system’s safety
(US Department of Energy, 2012, p.1-2).
IMO, recognizing the importance of consideration on organizational factors, made
positive attempts at system thinking by adopting the ISM Code and CIC and the
relevant guidelines. In particular, CIC suggests careful consideration of
organizational factors, by providing that any marine safety investigation report
should address causal factors including mechanical, organizational and human
factors. It, however, provides no specific references to accident causation models
though it supports Reason’s model implicitly. Furthermore, Reason’s model is
designed not to establish the investigation framework but to illustrate the generic
idea about organizational factors’ impact on accidents. Therefore, IMO adopted
supplementary guidelines to CIC by its resolution, A.1075(28), which provides
detailed areas of human and organizational factors to be inquired during
investigations. However, the mechanism recommended in these guidelines applies
the stopping rule too early to delve into the latent organizational factors hidden in the
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top rule-makers and decision-makers, as illustrated in figure 12.

Figure 12. Diagram, recommended by IMO, illustrating how a sequence of events
leads to a casualty occurrence
Source: IMO (2014). Guidelines to Assist Investigators in the Implementation of the
Casualty Investigation Code (Resolution MSC.255(84)): adopted by IMO Assembly
(A 28/Res.1075). London: Author.

Safety casualty investigation seeks understanding the organizational, cultural or
technical factors that, if left unattended, could cause recurrence. In other words, it is
meant to carefully examine “what” in the organizational system failed and “why” the
organization allowed itself to degrade to the state that resulted in an undesired
consequence, as illustrated in Figure 13. It is not so easy to disclose exact
contributing factors to accidents in the complex shipping system. Resources are
always limited and safety is only one of many competing priorities. Investigators,
therefore, should target the latent conditions most in need of urgent attention and
make them visible to those who manage the system so they can be corrected.
However, a number of marine accident reports fail to fully consider the
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organizational factors. A study, for example, reviewed 41 accident investigation
reports and made a comment that more organizational factors could have been
identified and that many investigators employed the stopping rule to too early a stage
of their investigation (Schröder-Hinrichs, 2011).

Figure 13. Factors contributing to organizational drift
Source: U.S. Department of Energy (2012). Accident and Occupational Safety Analysis (Vol.
I). Washington, D.C., US: Author.

After analyzing the seafarer’ sufferings from burdensome paperwork, Bhattacharya
(2012) stated on the distortion of the ISM Code’s aims as follows:
The purpose of the ISM Code, which was meant to offer the necessary support to
ship captains to ensure a safe operation of ships and continuously improve safety
management skills did not appear to be the objective in practice. Clearly the

45

managers complied with the Code to the letter and not to its spirit. In the process
they faced major resistance from seafarers who considered this approach
inadequate. Managers however interpreted it as seafarers’ apathy and deviance.
Their emphasis on training and rectifying seafarers’ behaviour are examples of
such interpretation. Yet, seafarers did not openly oppose the top-down
implementation of the SMS.
Given the above, the irony is that, if the top-down approach of the ISM Code is
applied to marine accident investigations, all the accidents should be attributable to
the managers who develop all the safety policies, but the reality so often see the
bottom-up tendency when it comes to blame. This is considered due to fact that ISM
Code, only taking managers’ interest into account, suggests the stereotypical idea that
the system is always just and, thus, it is the end-users that are to be blamed for their
non-compliance.
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CHAPTER 4.

SEEKING FOR THE TRADE-OFF BETWEEN
SAFETY AND BENEFIT

The above chapter gave consideration to both the merits and demerits of maritime
players in IMO’s work. This chapter attempts to grope for the effective way of
minimizing the players’ demerits while maximizing the merits of both the judges and
players.
4.1 Anticipated disadvantages in case of absence of maritime players in IMO
forums
Over-regulations or under-regulations?
Regulations can be frequently regarded as burden to the shipping activities. Safety or
environmental protection measures usually cause additional cost which should be
borne by the industry. Regulators, however, develop and enforce them because they
believe that those measures are in the general interest of the maritime sector. But the
industry, so often considering them to be in little need, takes a reluctant attitude
towards them. That is why few maritime regulations have ever been smoothly
implemented in a straightforward manner. Maritime regulation requires ample
expertise and experience of the broad sector from maritime technology and
shipbuilding to economics and international trade. The lack of these expertise and
experience may cause chaotic situations of both over-regulation and under-regulation
(Ma, 2018, p.143). ICS, anticipating the future of IMO, indicated that many of the
IMO meetings participants are now officials from environment ministries rather than
transport officials with specialist technical knowledge of shipping (ICS, 2018, p.28).
It shows an implicit concern about the evolving vacuum at IMO meetings which can
be filled only by knowledgeable groups.
The other eye-catcher is that too strict safety regulations have an adverse impact on
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the resilience, particularly, in complex sociotechnical systems like shipping. In order
to prove it, a simulated fishing was experimented on. Comparing fatality statistics in
the fishing industry with those in other occupational categories reveals that fishing is
one of the most dangerous occupations. The main reason for it is the fact that the
human being is a terrestrial species. Fishermen are consistently exposed to such
dangers as slippery platforms and awkward work postures (FAO, 2001. pp.1-5). That
is why the study decided to conduct experiment where 34 fishing skippers were
asked to fish in simulated situations. Contrary to the result expected, none of the
fishing skippers stopped fishing in extremely bad weather condition. Rather, they
applied various strategies to achieve their fishing goals by skillfully overcoming the
hostile conditions. The study concluded that, the more risks seafarers take, the more
skills and experiences they gain to avoid disasters. This conclusion led to a new idea
as follows:
Observed Safety = Sm + Sc
Sm: safety to be managed during performance
Sc: safety to be achieved thorough constraints
In the above formula, if Sm increases, Sc decreases, and vise versa (Gaël Morel et al.
2008). It shows that too rigid a safety system has adverse impact on its adaptive
capability.
How to ensure the trade-off between different interests
As shown above, absence of the interest group which is able to carry out economic
studies may lead to the undesirable results including either under-regulations or
over-regulations. Further the trade-off between safety and performance criteria is
very tough in real complex sciotechnical systems. However, some considerable
successes are witnessed in the international arena to promote good balance between
the public and private interests. The best examples include the mechanism of
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tripartism and social dialogue in ILO.
As the oldest UN agency, ILO aims at promoting social justice and internationally
recognized human and labor rights, pursuing its founding mission that social justice
is essential to universal and lasting peace. Since 1919 ILO brings together
governments, employers and workers of 187 member States to set labour standards,
develop policies and devise programmes promoting decent work for all women and
men (ILO, 2019)17. For example, MLC was developed and adopted based on the
consultation and consensus of governments, managers and seafarers. It provides
consolidated standards for seafarers’ decent working conditions through articles,
regulations and codes. For the purpose of this dissertation, proper attention is called to
its articles XIII and XIV.
Article XIII requires that the Special Tripartite Committee established by the
Governing Body of ILO shall keep the working of MLC under continuous review.
The Committee is required to be made up of two representatives nominated by the
government of each member States and the representatives of shipowners and
seafarers appointed by the Governing Body after consultation with the Joint
Maritime Commission. Under this unique system, article XIV provides requirements
that MLC should be amended based on balanced agreement of different interests as
shown in Figure 14.

17

Further information is given in the ILO websites:
https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/introduction-to-international-labour-standards/international-la
bour-standards-creation/lang--en/index.htm ,
https://www.ilo.org/global/standards/subjects-covered-by-international-labour-standards/tripartite-c
onsultation/lang--en/index.htm and
https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/workers-and-employers-organizations-tripartism-and-social-dialo
gue/lang--en/index.htm
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Figure 14. MLC amendment procedure
Source:Raphael Baumler (2018). Occupational Safety and Health Standards. Class handout,
Dalian Maritime University, Dalian, China.

By employing this unique mechanism, ILO strives to ensure effective negotiation,
consultation and exchange of information between representatives of governments,
employers and workers in implementing and updating MLC. Because of the
importance of tripartism, ILO has made the ratification and implementation of the
Tripartite Consultation Convention (1976) a priority. It is believed that this
mechanism ensures that employers’ and workers’ representatives have an equal voice
with those of governments in shaping its policies and programmes (Baumler, 2018,
pp.11-14).
4.2 Consideration on IMO’s current mechanism to ensure effective policy
making processes
ILO’s unique tripartite structure is very suggestive of the desirable trade-off between
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public and private interests. If IMO’s policy-making procedures are looked into, the
most notable is its efforts to ensure a uniform basis in proposing, considering,
adopting and implementing its instruments. The best example is included in the
Organization and method of work of the Maritime Safety Committee and the Marine
Environment Protection Committee and their subsidiary bodies (MSC/MEPC
Guidelines). IMO’s most important instruments including the six mandatory treaties
are considered, adopted and updated mainly at MSC and MEPC. The above
Guidelines, therefore, include key information on how IMO makes its decisions.
IMO member States should submit any safety/security or environment related
proposal to MSC or MEPC according to the MSC/MEPC Guidelines. Then those
committees tasked the cognizant sub-committees to consider it to see whether the
proposals are worthy of being addressed in their agenda. Based on the report of the
relevant sub-committees, the committees include the proposals into their agenda so
as to draft, consider, finalize and adopt them, as shown in Figure 15. The
sub-committees, with no right to accepting any new proposal from member States
(MSC/MEPC Guidelines, paragraph 4.9), should focus on conducting the technical
work entrusted to them (MSC/MEPC Guidelines, paragraph 5.9). In fact, MSC and
MEPC function as policy-making bodies while the sub-committees only play the role
of technical bodies in IMO rule-making processes.
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Figure 15. IMO tech rule making process in MSC/MEPC and their subsidiary bodies
Source: Author

IMO’s requirements ensuring industry’s participation
The MSC/MEPC Guidelines ensure industry’s involvement in several provisions.
First of all, MSC/MEPC, when accepting a proposal for new output of its agenda,
should consider its cost-effectiveness as well as its possibility of causing
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administrative burdens to maritime authorities (paragraph 4.15.5). Secondly the
committees should verify whether adequate industry standards exist or not
(paragraph 4.15.7).
When assessing the implication for capacity-building and technical cooperation in
accordance with resolution A.998(25), the Ad hoc Capacity-building Needs Analysis
Group (ACAG) is required to consult the industry. Further, the committees may
request ACAG to prepare a draft description on its work for consideration by the
member States as well as the industry (Annex 2 to these Guidelines.). The
identification of the capacity-building implication requires the following questions to
be fully answered:
-

Would the industry require new and/or enhancement of existing systems?
 Does capacity exist internationally to develop new systems?

-

Is there a need for additional training of seafarers?
 Do related and validated training courses exist?
 Are sufficient simulation training courses available internationally?

-

Will there be a requirement for new equipment?
 Does manufacturing capacity exist internationally?

-

Is there repair/servicing and/or retrofitting and does maintenance capacity

exist internationally?
All the above criteria for assessment, designed to reflect the commercial groups’
interest, can be fully met only when the industry players actively participate in the
consideration.
The above analysis shows that the MSC/MEPC Guidelines focus on Authorities’
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administrative burden as well as industry’s financial burden when considering new
safety/environmental protection measures. In this context, member Governments
may take it as granted to include industry officials from private companies into their
national delegations to IMO meetings.
IMO’s requirements ensuring NGO’s participation
ACAG is required to consult NGOs as well, when it works. In the existing IMO’s
policy-making processes, NGOs’ role can’t be overestimated under the relevant
IMO’s rules. They exercise their influence over IMO’s policy-making through the
IMO’s consultative membership scheme.
IMO grants a consultative status to an NGO in accordance with the Rules and
Guidelines for Consultative Status of Non-governmental International Organizations
with the International Maritime Organization (Consultancy Rules) if it can
reasonably be expected to make a substantial contribution to IMO’s work. Rule 1 of
these Rules provides the criteria of determining this contribution as follows:
(a) whether the NGO’s purposes are directly related to that of IMO and fully in
harmony with the spirit and functions of IMO;
(b) whether the NGO’s activities have a direct bearing on the main purposes of
IMO as a whole, or on the work of any of the committees or sub-committees or
on the matters dealt with in any conventions in respect of which IMO performs
depositary or other functions;
(c) whether the NGO has demonstrated that it has considerable expertise as well
as the capacity to contribute, within its field of competence, to IMO’s work; and
(d) whether there are any programmes or projects of the NGO which can
reasonably be considered as demonstrating the relevance of the NGO's work and
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interests to those of IMO.
In the above criteria, IMO focuses on the relevance between IMO and NGOs in
terms of purposes and activities and NGOs’ efficiency in respect of capabilities and
resources. Once an NGO is granted by IMO with the consultative status, it will be
endowed with specific privileges including the right to receive the IMO meeting
plans and resolutions, the right to be represented by an observer at meetings and the
right to submit documents on items of the agenda of IMO’s organs. Instead, the NGO
should make a substantial contribution to IMO’s work through its technical expertise
and inform the IMO Secretary-General of its activities which are likely to be of
interest to IMO.
IMO’s Council periodically review the contribution that the NGOs with consultative
statuses make and report to the Assembly accordingly. If the report indicates that
changes occur in the nature, purposes or activities of an NGO or that its contribution
is not so satisfactory, then the Assembly decides the withdrawal of the NGO’s
consultative status.
IMO’s limits to private interests’ involvement in the existing mechanism and
analysis thereof
As far as IMO is an intergovernmental agency, it aims at ensuring full and fair
representation of its member governments while it sets some limits to NGO’s
involvement in its policy-making processes.
Rule 6 of the Consultancy Rules confers on NGOs the right to submit documents to
IMO meetings. If the documents include proposals for the inclusion of new outputs,
they should be co-sponsored by member States in accordance with paragraph 4.11 of
the MSC/MEPC Guidelines.
IMO grants its consultant NGOs with the right to attend its meetings but the
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attendance is confined to specialist consultancy. Rule 7 of the Consultancy Rules
requires that one observer from each NGO shall be admitted to any meeting. Such
observer has no voting rights but may speak on any issue in the interest of his/her
NGO with the approval of the committees or sub-committees. However, this rule is
not observed in practice. For example, MEPC saw 18 observers from ICS, 7 from
INTERTANKO, 4 from INTERCARGO, 5 from WSC, etc. (MEPC 72/INF.1) while
MSC 99 witnessed 14 representatives from ICS, 5 from BIMCO, 4 from
INTERTANKO, 3 from INTERCARGO, etc. (MSC 99/INF.1) And there was no
explanation for these exceeding numbers.
IMO permits no duplication in the contribution of its consultant organizations. The
Consultancy Rules stipulates in Rule 3 that consultative status should not be granted
where each of two or more rival organizations purports to represent a particular
interest to the exclusion of the others. This is the only rule in IMO’s legal framework
which attempts to prevent conflicts. However, this rule focuses on conflict between
organizations of similar service, but not the conflicts of interests between public and
private agencies. For example, when the International Association of Technical
Survey and Classification Institutions (TSCI) applied to IMO for its consultant status,
the IMO Council, at its 120th session, decided not to grant such status to it, due to the
concern that TSCI’s contribution may overlap and, therefore, conflict with that of the
International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) which had already
provided IMO with its consultant assistance since long ago (C 120/D, p.15).
The above review shows that IMO has recognized both the importance of the
consultancy with the industry and the drawbacks of its over-involvement in the
maritime policy-making and has taken appropriate actions accordingly. The only
thing that IMO has missed is adequate attention to prevention against conflicts of
public and private interests in IMO forums. The disproportionate representation of
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different interests in IMO forums is indicated in the recent IMO documents on the
lists of participants as illustrated in Table 11. MEPC 71 and MSC 71, the IMO
forums with hottest topics, witnessed participants from trade associations accounting
for 53.8%18 of all while those from CSOs for 20.7%18 only. However, TC 67, mainly
addressing the topic of technical cooperation for developing States, was attended by
trade association representatives constituting only 21%18 of all. This unbalanced
representation indicates the partial influence of different interests. It also implies
what is the greatest concern of private interests in the IMO forums.

Table 11. The number of NGO participants present at recent IMO meetings, grouped
by interest and activities
Source: TI (2018). Governance at the International Maritime Organization. The case for
reform. Berlin: Author.

Private interest groups are notably active discussers at IMO meetings. At MEPC 71,
for example, consultative participants submitted 37 documents of which 26 were
from trade associations while the others from CSOs (MEPC 71/17). Rule 7 of the
Consultancy Rules allows in principle for all the NGOs’ constructive participation.
However, the consultative CSOs which represent environmental and climate change
concerns at committees suffer from limited participation in correspondence groups
18

Calculated by the author based on the figures listed in Table 11.
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and working groups elsewhere in IMO, perhaps due to lack of resources (TI, 2018,
p.25).
FSA considered as IMO’s most notable existing mechanism to ensure the trade-off
between public and private interests
Though IMO is one of the smallest of UN agencies, it is regarded as a model of
regulatory efficiency having developed a wide range of international treaties
governing every aspect of maritime affairs. It has a great reputation of having provided
an example of what can be achieved by governments when they make a serious
decision through international cooperation (ICS, 2018, p.26). From the outset IMO has
attempted to ensure effective cooperation between States and between governments
and industry and, thus, accumulated valuable experience therein. For example, IMO’s
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) mechanism contributes to adoption of safe, secure,
clean and efficient measures.
FSA, set forth in MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12/Rev.2, serves as a structured and systematic
methodology, aiming to promote maritime safety and protect marine environment by
using risk analysis and cost-benefit assessment. IMO approved the first version of
FSA guidelines at MSC 74 in 2001 and consistently updated them to see the latest
version in 2018. FSA is designed to constitute a tool which may be used in the IMO
rule-making process. The introduction of FSA to the IMO rule-making process
represented a fundamental change from what was previously a largely piecemeal and
reactive regulatory approach to one which is proactive, integrated, and above all
based on risk evaluation and management in a transparent and justifiable manner
thereby encouraging greater compliance with the maritime regulatory framework, in
turn leading to improved safety and environmental protection (Hesse, 2018, p.44).
According to the FSA guidelines, when any proposal to adopt a new instrument or to
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amend the existing one is brought forward, its value is required to be demonstrated
through risk and cost analysis. As shown in Figure 16, FSA comprises five steps
including hazards identification, risk analysis, risk control option (RCO)
identification, cost benefit assessment and recommendations for decision-making.
The FSA process commences with the decision-makers defining the problem to be
assessed along with any relevant conditions. These are referred to the FSA group
consisting of subject experts including technical and industry representatives who
will carry out FSA and submit the results thereof to the decision makers. The group
members should be suitably qualified and experienced. They analyze the relevant
risks, propose an RCO accordingly and assess the cost-effectiveness of the RCO. If
both the risk controlling ability and cost benefit of the RCO are fully demonstrated,
the decision-makers are to accept it (MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12/Rev.2).

Figure 16. Flow chart of the FSA methodology
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Source: IMO (2018). Revised Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for Use in the
IMO Rule-making Process (MSC-MEPC.2/Circ.12/Rev.2). London: Author.

FSA has been suitably employed across the IMO forums to contribute to trade-off,
transparency and efficiency in the IMO rule-making processes. For example, IACS
identified the hazards concerning general cargo ships, assessed the related risks
accordingly as shown in Table 12, identified possible 32 RCOs thereabout and
analyzed their cost-benefits. Following these proceedings, it distinguished acceptable
RCOs from unacceptable ones. For the purpose of this dissertation, RCOs 2 and 20
will be taken as examples among them.

Table 12. Casualty statistics and accident frequencies for general cargo ships
(1997-2008)
Source: IMO (2010). MSC 88/INF.8, p.9.

RCO2 on ECDIS integrated with AIS and RADAR was anticipated to contribute to
reduction of the risk of stranding and collision because it will enable the officer of
watch to pay attention only to one display without jumping between three displays.
In the step 4, its Gross Cost of Averting a Fatality (GCAF) was calculated as
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follows19.

GCAF =

Cost of RCO (US$ 34,800 + US$ 40,872) ÷25 years
=
= US$ 8,027,000
PLL
3.75E - 04
US$ 34,800: initial cost20
US$ 40,872: total operating cost20
25years: general cargo ships’ life time20
PLL: potential loss of life

Given this RCO’s economic benefit as estimated US$ 2,96020, its Net Cost of
Averting a Fatality (NCAF) was calculated as follows19.

NCAF =

Cost of RCO - Economic benefit US$ 3,027 - US$ 2,960

≈US$178,667
PLL
3.75E - 04

As for RCO 20 on port State control (PSC) inspector training on general cargo ships,
foundering accidents would be able to reduce by 42% (MSC 88/INF.6, p.86). This
RCO aims at increasing PSC inspectors’ expertise with respect to technical
inspection on ships. Given its total operating cost for 25 years－US$ 3,125 (MSC
88/INF.6, p.76), its GCAF was calculated as follows19.
GCAF = (US$ 3,125 ÷ 25 years) / 1.10E-03 ≈ US$ 113,636
The economic benefit per ship year was estimated US$ 2,431 (MSC 88/INF.6, p.76)
and, hence, the NCAF was calculated as follows19.
NCAF = (US$ 3,125 ÷ 25 years - US$ 2,431) / 1.10E-03 ≈ US$ -2,096,364
The calculated GCAF values are used to justify the RCOs for their life saving
capabilities while the NCAF values are summed up to see the need of regulation of
the RCOs with economic benefit taken into account. Any RCO is considered
19

Calculated by the author based on the data in IMO documents MSC 88/INF.6 and MSC 88/INF.8.

20

Provided by IACS in document MSC 88/INF.6
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acceptable if its GCAF is below US$ 3 million while its NCAF is negative (Skjong,
2019). As listed in table 13, the above FSA study shows that RCO 20 is a desirable
solution in respect of risk reduction and economic benefits as against RCO 2.
RCO
RCO 2
RCO 20

Reducing
risk
CN, WS
FD

Total operating
cost ($)
75,672
3,125

PLL (fat./
ship year)
3.75E-04
1.10-03

Benefit
($/ship year)
2,960
2,431

GCAF

NCAF

8.1E+06
1.1E+05

1.8E+05
-2.1E+06

Table 13. Summarized results of CBA on RCOs 2 and 20
Source: Author complied from IMO (2010). MSC 88/INF.8, p.16 and based on the author’s
own calculations.

The other RCOs were analyzed likewise. A summary of the results from the above
FSA study was submitted by IACS in document MSC 88/INF.8 to MSC 88 (MSC
88/19/2). MSC 88 (MSC 88/26, p.79) and MSC 89 (MSC 89/25, p.73) discussed the
IACS’s document and agreed to instruct the FSA groups to further consider the
recommended RCOs 17, 20, 26, 27 and 28. MSC 90, after considering document
MSC 90/WP.7 containing the report of the GBS/FSA working group, agreed to
include those recommended RCOs related actions into the relevant sub-committees’
biannual agenda (MSC 90/28, pp.78-91).
As seen above, the FSA methodology is quite suggestive of what the public wants to
see in the international forum in which complex standards should be established
through cooperation between several interests. It contains good ideas to make
possible the full balance between the public requirements and private interest.
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CHAPTER 5.

CONCLUSION

5.1 Findings
In the above chapters, the dissertation made an analysis of what is going on in the
international maritime forums, based on TI’s assessment of IMO’s governance.
Focusing on the issue of conflicts of interests, it attempted to answer the question
whether the industry’s involvement really has a negative impact on IMO forums and, if
so, how to tackle this problem.
As a regulatory body for shipping, IMO regards the consultation with the industry as
inevitable. IMO is not a regulator itself but a forum in which its 170 member States can
engage with one another and agree common global standards and policies. IMO has so
far functioned as a wonderful forum for shipping regulation. Because it provides all
the maritime States and interest groups with reasonable opportunities to enjoy the
achievable harmony in setting complex maritime standards, the maritime world
underwent the radical betterment which was inconceivable before IMO was born.
Thanks to IMO’s tireless efforts to promote maritime safety and ensure sound growth
of shipping, the world community has come to achieve the systematic and
well-defined maritime legal framework as illustrated in Figure 4 and, therefore, make
sure that its zero-accident dream will be realized in due course as implied in Figures 6,
7 and 8. It is out of question that the industry made tangible contributions to these
achievements through the consultancy scheme of IMO.
Yet IMO’s work leaves much to be desired as TI’s report indicates. The above analysis
also shows some undesirable pictures of the IMO decision-making system which are
quite different from what the public would like to see. For example, the studies on the
ISM Code offers meaningful hints thereabout. Before seeking an effective way of
adding better amendments to the ISM Code, the root cause for the relevant problems
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are to be first identified in the IMO governance system so that appropriate actions
could be taken for improvement of IMO policy-making processes.
In this age of development, nothing stands still. Continuous betterment should be
sought for without stagnation caused by over-conceit on the past achievement. TI’s
report provides a hint that it is the time for IMO to make a sound judgement whether its
existing shortcomings are diseases subject to medication or surgery.
5.2 Recommendations
In conclusion, it is the name of the game to ensure better balanced representation of
different interests in IMO forums. This dissertation, recognizing both the great
achievements and considerable inadequacies of IMO, recommends the following, on
the basis of the above comprehensive analysis.
Appointment of member State delegations
It is invited to establish a uniform set of rules that regulates the nomination of the
delegations by the IMO member States. These rules are supposed to aim at offering a
universal standards for the member States to ensure better representation of the public
interest in IMO forums.
It is recommended that these rules, inter alia, should provide the IMO member States
with an appropriate methodology of how they can fully demonstrate the absence of
conflicts of interests within their national delegations as well as across the IMO
meetings. Preferably, the rules are recommended to allow for the inclusion of private
industry officials only into non-Council member States’ delegations. It is considered as
an acceptable mechanism not only to prevent over-influence of Council member States
but also to remedy the under-representation of disadvantageous member States
illustrated in Table 10.
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If this is the case, some concerns may be raised about vacuum of technical expertise
and experience to evolve in the forums. IMO, however, can dispel such concerns by
employing or improving its existing mechanism. The MSC/MEPC Guidelines,
paragraph 4.6, requires that submissions containing proposals for new outputs must be
justified with regard to the following aspects, set out in annex 1 to the Guidelines:
•

whether the proposal is within the scope of IMO’s mission;

•

its need in terms of the risks or hazards which are deemed necessary to be
addressed;

•

its practicability, cost to the maritime industry as well as the relevant
legislative and administrative burdens;

•

benefits anticipated from its introduction;

•

availability of the relevant industry standards;

•

whether human elements are sufficiently addressed;

•

its urgency; and

•

action required.

The above requirements are designed to facilitate MSC/MEPC’s assessment of such
submissions. When the submissions containing the above demonstration are circulated
throughout the IMO member States before the relevant meetings, the industry is
provided with full opportunity of pre-meeting consideration of the submissions in
economic terms. Further, IMO has FSA mechanism in place. Its proceedings shown in
Figure 16 proved very helpful for demonstrating the practicability, transparency and
efficiency of newly proposed measures at IMO meetings. IMO’s FSA is considered as
one of the most effective and efficient mechanisms which aims to ensure the full
balance between the public and private interests, as analyzed in IACS’s examples
above. If IMO reinforces and updates all its relevant existing mechanisms in FSA as
well as in annex 1 to the MSC/MEPC Guidelines, the consultation with the industry
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will be further improved without physical participation of the industry representatives
at IMO meetings as IMO’s online document circulation system enables full
pre-meeting brainstorming. In other words, it is anticipated to contribute not only to
saving too many industry representatives the physical participation at the meetings but
also to minimizing the lack of voice of developing States across several IMO forums
by limiting the over-participation of the industry personnel from influential States. As
such, it will enable IMO to fully prove its efforts of preventing the over-involvement
by the industry in its rule-making.
It is also recommended to consider transferring the headquarters of IMO from the UK
to a more geographically suitable State. Since the number and roles of the newly
emerging maritime States are increasing in Asia as implied in Table 7, there is no
longer a need to hold fast to the traditional European maritime hub. Moreover, the high
expenses in the UK is considered to cause an uncontrollable burden to LDCs or SIDSs
in maintaining a permanent mission to IMO. On top of that, the UK is geographically
far away from most of LDCs or SIDSs, which may constitute one of their
disadvantages in sending suitably large delegations to IMO meetings. If IMO’s
headquarters will be transferred to a more geographically and economically
advantageous place, the operating cost of IMO itself will also be considerably saved,
which will lead to greater part of its budget allocated to international cooperation.
Taking this opportunity, IMO is recommended to make a critical decision of its new
location for its present as well as for its future.
Besides, IMO is invited to consider forum-specific standards for its member States’
delegation appointment system. For example, the Sub-Committee on Human Element,
Training and Watchkeeping (HTW) addresses human element related issues that
require the loud voice from seafarers. Thus, it is needed to consider regulating the
participation of representatives from governments, shipowners and seafarers at HTW
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meetings. Besides, it is worthy of considering the participation of seafarer
representatives in other sub-committees when these sub-committees discuss the ship
design or shipborne equipment which requires ergonomics and user-friendliness. IMO
is recommended to seek for a effective methodology of encouraging seafarers’
involvement in IMO policy-making.
Balanced participation of CSOs and trade associations in IMO policy-making
IMO is invited to take appropriate actions to ensure better balanced participation of
CSOs and trade associations at its meetings.
The above analysis considers that CSOs are frequently exceeded by trade associations
at IMO meetings, as shown in Table 11, perhaps mainly due to lack of resources of
CSOs. As mentioned above, paragraph 4.11 of the MSC/MEPC Guidelines requires
that submissions from NGOs for the inclusion of new outputs be co-sponsored by
member States. It is recommended to extend the application scope of this paragraph
to promotion of the close relationship between CSOs and industry interest groups.
For example, the existing Consultancy Rules may be amended to require that, when
an industry group submits any environmental protection related proposal to IMO, it
should be co-sponsored by an environment related CSO. When a trade association
submits any human element related proposal, that proposal may be required to be
co-sponsored by a trade union or seafarers association. These new regulations are
anticipated to further improve the current consultancy scheme of IMO in terms of
fairness, transparency and efficiency.
The principle of “one observer from each NGO” in Rule 7 of the Consultancy Rules
is required to be reviewed. Why this Rule has been breached so overtly remains a big
question. Consideration is needed. If Rule 7 is found unreasonable, it should be
amended accordingly, but if not, appropriate actions should be taken to ensure
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compliance with it with a view to the desirable balance in representation between
CSOs and industry organizations. If more than one observer must necessarily
participate in a meeting, the reasonable ground for it should be provided to the
relevant committees or sub-committees.
TI’ report recommendations include the development of the Code of Conduct
governing the behaviors of delegates of IMO’s member States and even providing for
sanctions against the breach of the Code. This dissertation would not go so far as to
comment this sensitive issue, but firmly believe that IMO will bring about a radical
turn in its work to create the bright maritime future which the public wants to see.
IMO has so far shown a wonderful model of continuously reviewing its mission and
vision to achieve and maintaining and improving its overall governance resources
and processes. This dissertation hopes that such model will be ever-lasting thanks to
IMO’s tradition of boldly acknowledging and overcoming its demerits and wisely
valuing and enriching its merits.
***
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Appendix 1

Make-up of delegations from some selected IMO member
States at MEPC 72 and MSC 99
Author compiled from IMO (2018)21

MEPC 72
BRAZIL
Head of Delegation
Adm. Sergio Roberto Fernandes dos Santos, Brazilian Permanent Representative
to IMO, Brazilian Permanent Representation to IMO
Representative
H.E. Mr. Hermano Telles Ribeiro, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of
Brazil to International Organizations in London, Permanent Representation of
Brazil to International Organizations in London
Alternates
Capt. Carlos Henrique de Lima Zampieri, Alternate Permanent Representative of
Brazil to IMO, Brazilian Permanent Representation to IMO
Ms. Ana Paula Simões Silva, Minister Counsellor, Alternate Permanent
Representative of Brazil to IMO, Permanent Representation of Brazil to
International Organizations in London
Advisers
Cdr. André Ricardo Araujo Silva, Mission Officer, Brazilian Permanent
Representation to IMO
R. Adm. Gilberto Santos Kerr, Assistant Coordinator, Coordinating Committee for
IMO Matters (CCA-IMO), Brazilian Navy
Mr. Nilson José Lima, Chief Engineer Officer (Merchant Marine), Mission

21

Extracted from the data included in MEPC 72/INF.1 and MSC 99/INF.1.
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Officer, Brazilian Permanent Representation to IMO
Capt. (Rtd.) Alberto Pereira Nogueira, Technical Consultant, Coordinating
Committee for IMO Matters (CCA-IMO), Brazilian Navy
Capt. (Rtd.) Fernando Alberto Gomes da Costa, Technical Consultant, Executive
Support Unit for the Coordinating Committee for IMO Matters (SEC-IMO),
Brazilian Navy
Ms. Marcia Jorio Villares da Costa, Technical Officer, Brazilian Permanent
Representation to IMO
Mrs. Ellen Mucke, Technical Officer, Brazilian Permanent Representation to IMO
Mr. Heiland Serotiuk
Representation to IMO

Lyrio,

Technical

Officer,

Brazilian

Permanent

Mr. Marco Antonio Costa Tritto, Bunker, Fuel, Oil, Residuals and Feedstock
Trading Manager, Brazilian Petroleum Company (PETROBRAS)
Mr. Luiz de Andrade Filho, Third Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Carlos Alberto Carloni, Director, Norsul Shipping Company
Mr. Luiz Gylvan Meira Filho, Visiting Researcher, Institute of Advanced Studies,
University of Sao Paulo - Brazil
Mr. Jorge Antonio Lopes, Environmental Consultant, Ministry of Mineral
Resources and Energy/Brazilian Petroleum Company (PETROBRAS)
Mr. Robson Calixto, Manager, Ministry of the Environment
Mr. Rodrigo Madeira Bermelho, Naval Engineer, Vale S.A.
Mr. Erasto Almeida, External Affairs Manager, Vale S.A.
Mr. Péricles Vieira Filho, Master Mariner, Vale S.A.
Mr. Rafael Fisher Dutra e Mello dos Santos, Naval Engineer, Vale S.A.
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CHINA
Head of Delegation
Representative
Mr. Zan Yang, Maritime Counsellor, Embassy of the People's Republic of China,
London
Alternates
Mr. Xinzhai Yang, Deputy Director General, China Maritime Safety
Administration
Mr. Xiaojie Zhang, Deputy Director General, Department of International
Cooperation, Ministry of Transport
Advisers
Mr. Xiaodong Zhang, First Secretary, Embassy of the People's Republic of China,
London
Mr. Tao Li, First Secretary, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, London
Mr. Shibo Li, Engineer, Shanghai Maritime University
Mr. Xingsen Chen, Section Chief, International Cooperation
Ms. Shuang Zhang, Research Assistant, Dalian Maritime University
Mr. Yinglei Zhao, Deputy Director, China Maritime Safety Administration
Ms. Huifang Wang, Senior Engineer, China Classification Society (CCS)
Mr. Yunzhi Fan, Senior Engineer, China Classification Society (CCS)
Mr. Lu Li, Professor, Shanghai Merchant Ship Design and Research Institute
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Mr. Lu Li, Senior Engineer, China Classification Society (CCS)
Mr. Leyi Dong, Director, China Maritime Safety Administration
Mr. Min Xu, Director, Shanghai Maritime Safety Administration
Mr. Bo Zhang, Principal Staff, Hebei Maritime Safety Administration
Mr. Ji Chen, China Ocean Shipping (Group) Company
Ms. Yuan Fang, Deputy Director, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Head of Delegation
Mr. Kwang Min Kim, Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to IMO, Embassy of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, London
Representative
Mr. Jun Hyok Im, Counsellor, Alternate Permanent Representative of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to IMO, Embassy of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, London

INDIA
Head of Delegation
Representatives
Mrs. Vishakha Yaduvanshi, First Secretary, High Commission of India, London
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Comdt. Bhim Singh, Director (Enviornment and Fisheries), Indian Coast Guard,
New Delhi
Mr. Satish Devdas Kamath, Engineer and Ship Surveyor, Engineering Wing

JAPAN
Head of Delegation
Mr. Jotaro Horiuchi, Minister of Transport, Alternate Permanent Representative
of Japan to IMO, Embassy of Japan, London
Representatives
Mr. Hideaki Saito, Director, Shipbuilding and Ship Machinery Division, Maritime
Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Mr. Shin Imai, Director of International Office, Ocean Development and
Environment Policy Division, Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism
Mr. Akira Fukaishi, First Secretary, Alternate Permanent Representative of Japan
to IMO, Embassy of Japan, London
Alternates
Mr. Yasufumi Onishi, Director for Environment Policy, Ocean Development and
Environment Policy Division, Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism
Mr. Yasuhiro Urano, Ocean Development and Environment Policy Division,
Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Mr. Kohei Iwaki, Special Assistant to the Director, Ocean Development and
Environment Policy Division, Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure,
Transport and Tourism
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Mr. Katsuya Shimizu, Chief Examiner, Inspection and Measurement Division,
Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Mr. Kiyoto Inoue, Director, International Ocean Affairs, Ocean Policy Division,
Policy Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Mr. Keisuke Yamane, Special Assistant to the Director, Marine Environment
Protection and Disaster Prevention Division, Guard and Rescue Department, Japan
Coast Guard
Mr. Yosuke Murata, Chief, Office of Marine Environment, Water Environment
Division, Environmental Management Bureau, Ministry of the Environment
Mr. Takafumi Horiuchi, Inspection and Measurement Division, Maritime Bureau,
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Advisers
Dr. Susumu Ota, Director, Centre for International Cooperation, National
Maritime Research Institute, National Institute of Maritime, Port and Aviation
Technology
Mr. Kenichi Kume, Senior Researcher, Fluids Engineering and Hull Design
Department, National Maritime Research Institute, National Institute of Maritime,
Port and Aviation Technology
Dr. Ryuji Miyake, Manager, Hull Department, Plan Approval Division, Nippon
Kaiji Kyokai (Class NK)
Mr. Yasunobu Araki, Manager, Ship Management Sysyems Department, Nippon
Kaiji Kyokai (Class NK)
Dr. Koichi Yoshida, Director, Technology Department, Ship Equipment
Inspection Society of Japan (HK)
Mr. Seiichi Tanaka, Chairman, Japan Ship Technology Research Association
Mr. Yasuhisa Mitani, Managing Director, Japan Ship Technology Research
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Association
Mr. Sadaharu Koga, Manager, Regulations Unit, Japan Ship Technology
Research Association
Mr. Yusuke Kawai, Regulation Team Staff, Regulation Unit, Japan Ship
Technology Research Association
Mr. Kazuyoshi Hirota, Japan Ship Technology Research Association
Mr. Takashi Yamamoto, Japan Ship Technology Research Association
Dr. Qing He, Japan Ship Technology Research Association
Mr. Takashi Yonezawa, Japan Ship Technology Research Association
Mr. Seijiro Morimoto, Senior Researcher, Planning and Research Department,
Japan Maritime Center
Mr. Masahiro Takahashi, Chairman of GHG Taskforce, The Japanese
Shipowners' Association
Mr. Hirohiko Oyabu, Member of GHG Task Force, The Japanese Shipowners'
Association
Mr. Masaki Nakagawa, The Japanese Shipowners’ Association
Ms. Kumiko Iwasa, Member of GHG Task Force, The Japanese Shipowners'
Association
Mr. Tamio Kawashima, General Manager of Europe District Branch, The
Japanese Shipowners' Association
Cdr. Keiji Takechi, Director, London Research Office, The Japan Association of
Marine Safety
Mr. Takeshi Mizunari, Senior Researcher, Marine Pollution Prevention Research
Department, The Japan Association of Marine Safety
Mr. Katsumi Yoshida, Chief Manager, Laboratory of Aquatic Science Consultant
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Co., Ltd.
Dr. Takuro Omura, Chief Scientist, Laboratory of Aquatic Science Consultant
Co., Ltd.
Mr. Akira Sugawara, Senior Researcher, Research Institute for Environmental
Strategies, Inc.
Ms. Liliana Martinez Rivera, Analyst, Research Institute for Environmental
Strategies, Inc.
Mr. Yasuhiro Ueda, Director, Japan Ship Centre (JETRO)
Mr. Takanori Maeda, Director, Japan Ship Centre (JETRO)
Mr. Takuya Minato, Director, Japan Ship Centre (JETRO)

RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Head of Delegation
Mr. Yury Melenas, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to IMO,
Mission of the Russian Federation to IMO, London
Alternates
Mr. Alexander Poshivay, Deputy Head, Federal Agency "Rosmorrechflot"
Mr. Murad Nasrutdinov, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian
Federation to IMO, Mission of the Russian Federation to IMO, London
Advisers
Mr. Sergey Tolmachev, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation
to IMO, London
Mr. Alexander Suvorov, Head of Ships, Service Department, Russian Maritime
Register of Shipping
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Mr. Viktor Grishkin, Principal Specialist, Head of Section, Russian Maritime
Register of Shipping
Ms. Olga Tsyrkun, С hief Specialist Expert, Federal Agency of Maritime and
River Transport
Mrs. Natalia Kutaeva, Counsellor to the Director, MRS, Federal Agency of
Maritime and River Transport
Mr. Vladimir Shurpyak, Senior Principal Surveyor, Machinery Department,
Russian Maritime Register of Shipping
Mr. Nikolay Stupakov, PSCO Saint Petersburg, FSBI "The Administration of the
Baltic Sea Ports"
Mr. Ilya Ivanov, Senior Surveyor, Machinery Department, Russian Maritime
Register of Shipping
Mr. Dmitry Yudin, Senior State Inspector, FSBI “Administration of the Western
Arctic Seaports”
Mr. Alexey Ivanchin, Senior Expert, Central Marine Research and Design Institute
(CNIIMF)

UKRAINE
Head of Delegation
Mr. Vitalii Moshkivskyi, Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative of
Ukraine to IMO, Embassy of Ukraine, London

UNITED KINGDOM
Head of Delegation
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Miss Katy Ware, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland to IMO and Director of Maritime Safety and
Standards, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
Alternates
Mr. Gwilym Stone, Assistant Director, Ship Standards, Maritime and Coastguard
Agency (MCA)
Mr. Kevin Hunter, International Relations Manager (Technical), International
Liaison Branch, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
Advisers
Ms. Claire McAllister, Assistant Director, Maritime Safety and Environment,
Department for Transport (DfT)
Ms. Katie Carleton, Head, Maritime International Environment and Climate
Change, Department for Transport (DfT)
Ms. Morna Cannon, Senior Policy Adviser, International Environment and
Climate Change, Department for Transport (DfT)
Mr. Ian Timpson, Senior Policy Adviser, Ship Emissions and Recycling, Maritime
Safety and Environment Division (MSE), Department for Transport (DfT)
Ms. Paula Spencer, Senior Policy Adviser, International Environment and Climate
Change, Maritime Safety and Environment Division (MSE), Department for
Transport (DfT)
Mr. Jonathan Simpson, Head, Environmental Policy, Maritime and Coastguard
Agency (MCA)
Mr. David MacRae, Environmental Policy Specialist, Environmental Policy
Branch, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
Mr. Bennett Ng, Environmental Policy Specialist, Environmental Policy Branch,
Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)

86

Ms. Anna Ziou, Policy Director, UK Chamber of Shipping
Mr. Owen Bellamy, Policy Adviser, Committee on Climate Change
Ms. Yue Yao, Principal Specialist in Charge, Statutory Section, Lloyd’s Register
Asia
Dr. Zabi Bazari, Managing Director, Energy and Emissions Solutions
Mr. Sam Wright, EU Lead, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
Mr. Adam Laidouci, Second Secretary - Transport, UK Representative Brussels,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO)

UNITED STATES
Head of Delegation
Mr. Jeffrey G. Lantz, Director, Commercial Regulations and Standards, United
States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security
Representatives
Mr. Wayne M. Lundy, Systems Engineering Division, Office of Design and
Engineering Standards, United States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland
Security
Mr. Christopher Laroo, Environmental Scientist, Transportation and Air Quality
Office, Environmental Protection Agency
Advisers
Ms. Trisha Bergmann, International Affairs Specialist, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration
Capt. Sean Brady, Office of Operating and Environmental Standards,
Commercial, United States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security

87

Lt. Cdr. Joel Coito, Coast Guard Liaison Officer, Department of State
Dr. Lisa Drake, Scientist, Naval Research Laboratory, Department of the Navy
Dr. Richard Everett, Biologist, Environmental Standards Division, United States
Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security
Ms. Hayley Gillooly, Foreign Affairs, State Department
Ms. Neha Lugo, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
Mr. Dale Murad, Attorney/Adviser, United States Coast Guard, Department of
Homeland Security
Mr. Andrew Rakestraw, Office of Global Change, Department of State
Ms. Debra DiCianna, Private Consultant, Eastern Research Group, Inc., (ERG)
Mr. Joseph Gardemal, Senior Principal Engineer, American Bureau of Shipping
Mr. Robert Hughes, Americas Operations and Global Technical Manager, Ocean
Transportation, Gargill, Inc.
Mr. Theodore J. Tarabulski, Regulatory Consultant, Caterpillar Inc.
Mr. James Weakley, President, Lake Carrier's Association
Ms. Dena Brownlow, Counsellor for Environment, Science, Technology and
Health, Permanent Representative of the United States of America to IMO,
Embassy of the United States of America, London

MSC 99
BRAZIL
Head of Delegation
Adm.

Sergio

Roberto

Fernandes
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dos

Santos,

Brazilian

Permanent

Representative to IMO, Brazilian Permanent Representation to IMO
Representative
H.E. Mr. Hermano Telles Ribeiro, Ambassador, Permanent Representative of
Brazil to International Organizations in London, Permanent Representation of
Brazil to International Organizations in London
Alternates
Capt. Carlos Henrique de Lima Zampieri, Alternate Permanent Representative
of Brazil to IMO, Brazilian Permanent Representation to IMO
Ms. Ana Paula Simões Silva, Minister Counsellor, Alternate Permanent
Representative of Brazil to IMO, Permanent Representation of Brazil to
International Organizations in London
Advisers
R. Adm. (Rtd.) Francisco Carlos Ortiz de Holanda Chaves, Executive Secretary,
Brazilian Navy, Executive Support Unit for the Coordinating Committee for IMO
Matters
Capt. Marcello Gama, Division Assistant, Navy Staff
Capt. (Rtd.) Jorge Mauro Fiorito, Maritime Adviser, Executive Support Unit for
the Coordinating Committee for IMO Matters, Brazilian Navy
Cdr. Andr é Ricardo Araujo Silva, Mission Officer, Brazilian Permanent
Representation to IMO
Mr. Nilson José Lima, Chief Engineer Officer (Merchant Marine), Mission
Officer, Brazilian Permanent Representation to IMO
Mr. Heiland Serotiuk
Representation to IMO

Lyrio, Technical

Officer, Brazilian Permanent

Mrs. Ellen Mucke, Technical Officer, Brazilian Permanent Representation to
IMO
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Ms. Marcia Jorio Villares da Costa, Technical Officer, Brazilian Permanent
Representation to IMO
Mr. Marcelo Campello Cajaty Gonçalves, Pilot, Brazilian Pilots' Association
Mr. Luis Adelson Dantas, Marine Engineer (Technical Consultant), Brazilian
Petroleum Company (PETROBRAS)
Mr. Fernando José Rodrigues Teixeira, Naval Architect, Brazilian Petroleum
Company (PETROBRAS)

CHINA
Head of Delegation
Representative
Mr. Zan Yang, Maritime Counsellor, Embassy of the People's Republic of
China, London
Alternates
Mr. Xiaojie Zhang, Deputy Director General, Department of International
Cooperation, Ministry of Transport
Mr. HongYin Li, Deputy Director General, China Maritime Safety
Administration, Ministry of Transport
Mr. Feng Sun, Vice President, China Classification Society (CCS)
Advisers
Mr. Xingsen Chen, Section Chief, International Cooperation
Mr. Hui Xie, Director, China Maritime Safety Administration
Mr. Bo Ning, Deputy Director, China Maritime Safety Administration
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Mr. Yikang Shen, Senior Engineer, Shanghai Maritime Safety Administration
Mr. Zhirong Wang, Director, Technical Management Department
Ms. Zhe Li, Zhejiang Maritime Safety Administration
Mr. Yuliang Cai, Deputy General Manager, China Classification Society (CCS)
Mr. Wu Sun, Engineer, China Classification Society (CCS)
Mr. Gaofeng Zhang, Senior Engineer, China Classification Society (CCS)
Mr. Renping Zhang, Director, Dalian Maritime University
Mr. Yingjun Zhang, Professor, Dalian Maritime Safety Administration
Mr. Kangxu Ren, Manager, Shanghai Shipbuilding Technology Research
Institute
Mr. Xin Li, Director, Shanghai Merchant Ship Design and Research Institute
Mr. Jusheng Hu, Manager, China Shipping (Group) Company
Mr. Hongjun Li, Director, Beijing Satellite Navigation Centre (BSNC)
Mr. Caibo Hu, Senior Engineer, Beijing Satellite Navigation Centre (BSNC)
Dr. Xiaodong Zhang, First Secretary, Embassy of the People's Republic of
China, London
Mr. Li Tao, First Secretary, Embassy of the People's Republic of China, London

DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA
Head of Delegation
Mr. Hyon Il Nam, Deputy Director-General, Maritime Administration
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Representatives
Mr. Kwang Min Kim, Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to IMO, Embassy of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, London
Mr. Jun Hyok Im, Counsellor, Alternate Permanent Representative of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to IMO, Embassy of the Democratic
People's Republic of Korea, London
Alternate
Mr. Chung Song Kim, Senior Officer, Maritime Administration

INDIA
Head of Delegation
Mr. Suresh Kumar R.M., Chief Ship Surveyor, Directorate General of Shipping,
Ministry of Shipping
Representatives
Dr. Aseem Vohra, Second Secretary Political, International Organization and
Education, High Commission of India, London
Mr. Praveen Kumar Mishra, Vice President, Indian Register of Shipping
Mr. Sandeep Singh, Attaché, High Commission of India, London

JAPAN
Head of Delegation
Mr. Jotaro Horiuchi, Minister of Transport, Alternate Permanent Representative
of Japan to IMO, Embassy of Japan, London
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Representatives
Mr. Yuji Mori, Director, Ship Safety Standards Office, Safety Policy Division,
Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Mr. Akira Fukaishi, First Secretary, Alternate Permanent Representative of
Japan to IMO, Embassy of Japan, London
Ms. Hiroyo Hiramatsu, First Secretary, Embassy of Japan, London
Alternates
Mr. Tomoyasu Izaki, Director, International Affairs, Seafarers Policy Division,
Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Cdr. Hideki Noguchi, Deputy Director, International Affairs and Technical
Development Office, Administration and Planning Division, Maritime Traffic
Department, Japan Coast Guard
Mr. Yasuhiko Kawazu, Deputy Director, Cabinet Office
Mr. Koki Matsushima, Chief, Seafarers Policy Division, Maritime Bureau,
Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Mr. Tomotsugu Noma, Chief, Ship Safety Standards Office, Safety Policy
Division, Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and
Tourism
Mr. Satoshi Usada, Chief, Ship Safety Standards Office, Safety Policy Division,
Maritime Bureau, Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Ms. Yukie Yajima, Engineer, Cabinet Office
Advisers
Dr. Susumu Ota, Director, Centre for International Cooperation, National
Maritime Research Institute, National Institute of Maritime, Port and Aviation
Technology
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Capt. Masashi Sugomori, Senior Coordinator, International Affairs Division,
Knowledge Capital Department, Japan Agency of Maritime Education and
Training for Seafarers
Dr. Koichi Yoshida, Director, Technical Department, Ship Equipment Inspection
Society of Japan (HK)
Mr. Hironori Eguro, Regulations Team Staff, Regulations Unit, Japan Ship
Technology Research Association
Mr. Takumi Yoshida, Japan Ship Technology Research Association
Mr. Takuya Nakashima, Japan Ship Technology Research Association
Dr. Toshiro Arima, Director, Rule Development and ICT Division, Nippon Kaiji
Kyokai (Class NK)
Mr. Satoshi Sasaki, Manager, Machinery Rules Development Department, Rule
Development and ICT Division, Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (Class NK)
Mr. Kenshi Yoshimura, Surveyor, Hull Rules Development Department, Rule
Development and ICT Division, Nippon Kaiji Kyokai (Class NK)
Capt. Tomonori Okamura, Chief Researcher, Technology and Research
Department, The Maritime Human Resource Institute
Mr. Koji Tomioka, The Shipbuilders' Association of Japan (SAJ)
Mr. Shinji Takiguchi, The Shipbuilders' Association of Japan (SAJ)
Mr. Tamio Kawashima, General Manager, Europe District Branch, The Japanese
Shipowners' Association
Mr. Masaru Kashima, Deputy General Manager, Marine Division, The Japanese
Shipowners' Association

Cdr. Keiji Takechi, Director, London Research Office, The Japan Association of
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Marine Safety
Cdr. Masahiro Kurohara, Manager, International Office, The Japan Association
of Marine Safety
Mr. Yoshihiro Toyomitsu, Deputy Director, International Affairs Bureau, All
Japan Seamen's Union
Mr. Nobuyuki Ito, Manager, Marine Electronics Engineering Department,
Marine Systems Division, Japan Radio Co., Ltd.
Mr. Daiju Ichinose, Manager, QZSS Promotion Office, NEC Corporation
Mr. Yoshiyuki Murai, Senior Technical Marketing Specialist, KANEMATSU
Corporation

RUSSIAN FEDERATION
Head of Delegation
Dr. Vitaly Klyuev, Director, Department of State Policy for Maritime and River
Transport, Ministry of Transport
Alternates
Mr. Yury Melenas, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to
IMO, Mission of the Russian Federation to IMO, London
Mr. Murad Nasrutdinov, Deputy Permanent Representative of the Russian
Federation to IMO, Mission of the Russian Federation to IMO, London
Advisers
Mr. Dmitry Mostovshchikov, Senior Principal Surveyor, Ships in Service
Department, Russian Maritime Register of Shipping
Mr. Sergey Tolmachev, Counsellor, Permanent Mission of the Russian
Federation to IMO, London
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Mr. Vladimir Korenev, Senior Surveyor of Murmansk Branch, Russian
Maritime Register of Shipping
Mr. Yury Pankrashkin, Deputy Head of Department, Department for Provision
of Navigation, Federal Agency for Maritime and River Transport
Mr. Denis Pavlov, Principal Surveyor of Murmansk Branch, Russian Maritime
Register of Shipping
Mr. Vladimir Kuzmin, PSC Officer, FSBI "The Administration of the Baltic
Sea Ports"
Mr. Igor Khocholava, Harbour Master of Tuapse Port, FSBI "The
Administration of the Baltic Sea Ports"
Prof. Sergey Kondratiev, Rector, Admiral Ushakov State Maritime University
Dr. Vladimir Vasilyev, Deputy Director General, Central Marine Research and
Design Institute
Capt. Viktor Chernov, First Deputy Head, Maritime Rescue Service

UKRAINE
Head of Delegation
H.E. Ms. Natalia Galibarenko, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary,
Permanent Representative of Ukraine to IMO, Embassy of Ukraine, London
Representatives
Mr. Andriy Galushchak, State Secretary, Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
Mr. Vitalii Moshkivskyi, Counsellor, Deputy Permanent Representative of
Ukraine to IMO, Embassy of Ukraine, London
Mr. Oleksandr Basiuk, Director, Department of Reform and Functioning of
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Maritime and Inland Water Transport, Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
Ms. Viktoriia Gulenko, First Secretary, Directorate General for International
Law, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine
Mr. Yaroslav Iliasevych, Head of Unit, Department of Reform and Functioning
of Maritime and Inland Water Transport, Ministry of Infrastructure of Ukraine
Mr. Volodymyr Kolosyuk, Deputy Head of Operations, Ukrainian Sea Ports
Authority
Mr. Viacheslav Voloshyn, Head of Chornomorsk Branch, Ukrainian Sea Ports
Authority
Capt. Mykola Sevyrin, Head of Maritime Safety and Environmental Protection
Department, Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority
Mr. Andriy Grygoryev, Deputy Head of Maritime Safety and Environmental
Protection Department, Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority
Mr. Dmytro Nahaievskyi, Senior Specialist, Ukrainian Sea Ports Authority
Mr. Volodymyr Rabotnov, Deputy Director, Secretary of the State Coordination
Committee, Marine Search and Rescue Service
Capt. Stanislav Nezavitin, Harbour Master, Port of Chornomorsk
Mr. Oleksii Stepanov, Deputy Head, Information Support Centre, Marine
Search and Rescue Service

UNITED KINGDOM
Head of Delegation
Miss Katy Ware, Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland to IMO and Director of Maritime Safety and
Standards, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
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Alternates
Mr. Gwilym Stone, Assistant Director, Ship Standards, Maritime and
Coastguard Agency (MCA)
Mr. Kevin Hunter, International Relations Manager (Technical), International
Liaison Branch, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
Advisers
Mr. Edward Statton, Policy Adviser, International Shipping and Counter Piracy,
Maritime Security and Resilience Division, Department for Transport (DfT)
Mr. Glenn Richardson, Assistant Director, Business Governance, Maritime and
Coastguard Agency (MCA)
Ms. Katrina Kemp, Smart Ships and Automation Policy Officer, International
Liaison Branch, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
Mr. Ronald Allen, Policy Lead, Stability, Marine Technology Branch, Maritime
and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
Mr. Simon Owens, Policy Lead, Fire Safety and Engineering, Marine
Technology Branch, Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA)
Mr. Nico Ramos, Policy Lead, Life Saving Appliances, Maritime and
Coastguard Agency (MCA)
Ms. Fena Boyle, Nautical Manager, UK Chamber of Shipping
Mr. Anderson Chaplow, Senior Specialist, Marine, Lloyd’s Register EMEA
Mr. Andrew Sillitoe, Lead Specialist, Regulatory Affairs, Lloyd's Register
EMEA
Dr. Jack Corbett, Associate Professor in Politics, Politics and International
Relations, University of Southampton
Mr. John Dodd, Director of Safety and Standards Maritime, Inmarsat
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Mr. Robert Carington, Policy Adviser, UK Chamber of Shipping
Mr. Rakesh Pandit, Nautical Policy Lead, Navigation Safety, Maritime and
Coastguard Agency (MCA)

UNITED STATES
Head of Delegation
R. Adm. John Nadeau, Assistant Commandant for Prevention Policy, United
States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security
Representatives
Mr. Jeffrey G. Lantz, Director, Commercial Regulations and Standards, United
States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland Security
Ms. Trisha Bergmann, International Affairs Specialist, National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration
Lt. Cdr. Joel Coito, Coast Guard Liaison Officer, Department of State
Capt. Albert Janin, Admiralty Counsel of the Navy, Office of the Judge Advocate
General Naval League Service Command
Cdr. Jason Levy, Oceans Policy Adviser, The Pentagon-Office of the Secretary of
Defense
Ms. Mayte Medina, Chief, Maritime Personnel Qualifications Division,
Commercial Regulations and Standards Directorate, United States Coast Guard,
Department of Homeland Security
Cdr. John Miller, Chief, Systems Engineering Division, United States Coast
Guard, Department of Homeland Security
Mr. Cameron Naron, Adviser, Department of Transportation
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Lt. Cdr. Jeffrey Noyes, Attorney Adviser, Prevention Law Division, Office of
Maritime and International Law, United States Coast Guard, Department of
Homeland Security
Mr. Gregory J. O'Brien, Senior Oceans Policy Adviser, Office of Ocean and Polar
Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs,
Department of State
Mr. Jaideep Sirkar, Chief, Naval Architecture Division, Office of Design and
Engineering Standards, United States Coast Guard, Department of Homeland
Security
Mr. Louis Bell, Electronics Engineer, Federal Communications Commission
Advisers
Ms. Nina Beebe, Director, Emerging Markets, Access Partnership
Mr. Bryan Hartin, Executive Vice President, Iridium
Ms. Dena Brownlow, Counsellor for Environment, Science, Technology and
Health, Permanent Representative of the United States of America to IMO,
Embassy of the United States of America, London
Ms. Tatiana Lawrence, Vice President, International Regulatory Affairs, Iridium

※ Some States such as Sierra Leon or Tonga failed to send their delegations to
MEPC 72 and MSC 99.

***

100

Appendix 2

Non-governmental Organizations in Consultative Status by
Interests/Activities

(Categories as approved by C 108 － Related documents: 15(d)/1 and D)
Updated by IMO in July 201822

22

Further information is given in the IMO website: https://docs.imo.org/Category.aspx?cid=746
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